LAUSANNE — GENEVA
J. T. MURPHY'S DESERTION
SEE WITHIN



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THE LAUSANNE-GENEVA GAMBLE WITH MARKED CARDS

EACH partner arrived at Lausanne with his riddle-game, the unravelling of which involved no great difficulty: the French desire the status quo, the Germans do not want it; the English bluntly declare that the old is gone for ever, and the United States has no objection to any combination by which it will not be the loser. Why was the Lausanne Conference called? For the purpose of finding a way out of the blind alley. Nevertheless the very first utterances of the great capitalist powers indicated that Lausanne is nothing but a prolongation of Geneva: there was endless talk at Geneva about disarmament to camouflage the feverish arming in progress. At Lausanne there is much prating about reparations, "normalising" economic relations merely to conceal the unwillingness and inability to solve insoluble contradictions. As inevitably happens in such cases, the imperialist gentlemen began to seek a "universal panacea," as though the cursed problems of to-day could be answered by a fig-leaf of smoothly polished phrases.

* * *

The Lausanne mart was opened with a declaration of the five powers—England, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan. The declaration speaks ominously of "economic and financial dangers threatening the whole world," and asserts that this "problem requires clear and final solution directed towards ameliorating the condition of Europe." Furthermore, in the opinion of these five powers, "the solution of these problems must be arrived at without delays or intermissions." This preface of great promise closes with the following proposal, quite breath-taking in its daring: "The powers agree to defer payments due from governments participating in this conference as long as the latter is in session." Startling enough, "a bloody battle was promised and barely a steer-corner fray took its place." It would appear that the whole trouble lies in the fact that if payments had to be made during the term of the conference, difficulties would be involved. As a matter of fact, the representatives of these five powers, including MacDonald, recent leader of the Second International, know only too well that this is not the question.

They know that Germany, the chief debtor, *cannot* meet payments and that the financial and economic problems which face European capitalism, spreading and becoming more aggravated by the crisis, cannot be solved by a two months' extension for payments. What need, then, for such a declaration? The statement in question is intended for the ears of the gallery. It is meant to show the masses the "healthy optimism" of state politicians. But it once again merely demonstrates the complete impotence of the imperialist powers to drag the shattered, sunken chariot of capitalism from its morass.

The statement by the five powers merely served to emphasise the reply of Herriot to Von Papen's obvious hints that "should no improvement be recorded in the near future, all state and private debts will have to be reconsidered." Moreover, Von Papen, plucking up his courage, called upon his audience to glance into the future, and not the past, exclaiming: "We must take action."

Herriot did not waste a minute in replying. He started to "act," for he, too, has no desire to dally with the past. What France has already fleeced from Germany fails to interest him. It is the future in which his interests lie as well. He therefore approaches the question from the angle of the future, categorically supporting his friend, MacDonald, in "fulfilment of the agreement — which is the one measure capable of forming a basis for the international morals (!) of the new period."

But Herriot is not content with these wise utterances, which had been interminably repeated by Clemenceau, Poincaré, Tardieu and Lavalle, with equal effectiveness, prior to his appearance. As representative of the "Left" Government, he held it necessary to enter into considerations of a more general character. To begin with, he told his audience the glad tidings that "in conformance with the laws of history, every depression period is followed by a period of prosperity," then, juggling with figures, he attempted to show that, should Germany fail to make payments, so much the worse for her. He next flaunted several ingenious quotations from the memorandum of the Basle experts before his audience, winding up with the sonorous phrase: "The action which must be taken far outreaches the ramifications of the German problem alone. We demand for the French Republic only the same justice which the latter stands ready to extend to all nationalities."

We have long been aware that the French imperialists spend sleepless nights pondering how to establish "justice" on earth. That is why they maintain the largest army in the world, that explains the expenditure of half their budget on the army, navy and air force—this is the explanation for their flotation of loans for Rumania and Poland, for the construction of strategic roads, for signing military agreements with Japan and

war preparations against the U.S.S.R. This is all well known to us through the activities of Monsieur Herriot's forerunners, since the gentleman in question fulfils the same social obligations as did Mons. Tardieu.

It was quite obvious from the first explanations that further parley would be mere repetition. That the "dispute is carried on by words, and systems formed from words" has long been known. MacDonald, creator of verbal systems, MacDonald the "Peace Maker" now appears on the scene. He has drawn up the theses, which, from a report in the "Lokal Anzeiger," consist of the following :—

(1) The decision taken on each question is final.
(2) Decisions must not bear a character which might hinder the re-establishment of mutual trust in the world.
(3) Reparation payments will not be cancelled until such time as Germany restores its national economy.
(4) Payments must not endanger the German trade balance or budget.
(5) Payments must not affect international trade relations.

These theses reveal that MacDonald favours "final" decisions. But at Geneva one finds no adversaries of conclusive decisions. The Germans hanker for the final annulment of reparations—the French are equally eager for a final decision to the contrary.

The second point is equally portentous, in reality, calling on everyone to be generally content and happy and for the decisions not to interfere with anyone, etc.

We shall not dwell further on these theses. One thing is clear, despite all their pitiful pettiness, they are evidence of the fact that England and France disagree on the question of reparations. The English bourgeoisie holds that further pressure on the reparation screw may cause an eruption. But, on the other hand, England does not care to give Germany its wholehearted support, since it is undesirous of occasioning a break with France. Consequently, the manoeuvring, proposals of semi-concessions, the desire to maintain a united front with France—and not thrust Germany aside. The English diplomats weave a complicated pattern in Lausanne.

The Lausanne conference could not emerge from the deadlock because it is impossible to find a solution whereby the Germans would stop their payments—and the French continue to receive billions. After the exchange of declarations and stereotyped courtesies, through which the mutual bestial hatred for each other is glimpsed, the Germans and French entered into direct negotiations. The following diplomatically pruned communiqué was issued after their first joint session :

"The German Minister of Finances, Shverin-Krossik, set forth the reasons which in his opinion compel the complete annulment of reparations as well as the initial measures to be taken for the economic restoration of Europe.

"Reichskanzler Von Papen augmented and elaborated on this statement from a general point of view in his speech. Herriot, on his part, entered reservations on the German statement which he considered important. The session has been postponed until June 29th."

Finally, the German proposition, elucidated by Shverin-von-Krossim in six points, appeared :—

(1) Germany's inability to pay reparations; (2) readiness of Germany to participate in financial aid to Austria and other Central European countries; (3) readiness to participate in stabilising valuta within the ramifications of the world economic conference; (4) extension of Franco-German cartel agreements; (5) extension of Franco-German customs agreements; and (6) German participation in the "common" fund or "joint treasury."

These declarations (and Von Papen's) are clear evidence that Germany is prepared to compensate; in other words, Germany retreats before the onslaught of French imperialism.

What does the dispute centre around at the moment?

Germany is prepared to pay 2-2½ milliards of marks as a final settlement of reparations, upon the following four conditions :—

(1) The annulment of the war guilt clause relating to Germany.
(2) Recognition of final settlement without regard to debts to U.S.A.
(3) Equal rights on questions of armaments.
(4) Sums supplied no longer to be called reparations but funds for the restoration of Europe.

Of these conditions the easiest is the last; to the Versailles creditors a rose by any other name is just as sweet—reparations, compensation, or restoration fund.

The main difficulty lies in the first and the third points. France cannot withdraw her only moral-political trump against Germany. Since 1914 French imperialism (with the full support of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals) has built her rapacious policy on the "guilt" of Germany—and suddenly renouncing, at the advent of the world crisis, the cornerstone of 18 years policy, MacDonald, in his searching for "formulae," proposes to regard the eighth section of the Versailles Treaty as "outside the purview" of the conference. But France has derived too much

benefit to accept any such proposal. The renunciation of the thesis of Germany's exclusive war-guilt denotes such a blow at the Versailles system that France cannot accept it. This is why this question (at first sight simple) conceals in itself a colossal insoluble difficulty which no amount of ambiguous formulae can overcome.

The second question of the final payment sum is less difficult but no less complicated. England, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan demand 4,200,000,000 marks, connecting this question with that of the allied debts to U.S.A. But as the discussions showed it would have been comparatively easy to haggle about the amount if the agreement destroying the Young Plan had been amplified by political guarantees. But here the backstairs intrigues commenced, carefully concealed from the masses of the people.

Herriot charged Von Papen with connecting economics with politics. Von Papen returned the compliment. It is not strange that both were lying—and both were right. They were right because each of them connected economic questions with first rank political questions; they both lied in endeavouring to show that neither of them was thinking about politics.

In what consisted this stubbornly concealed policy? Herriot sought a guarantee for the Polish frontier and required no less than a pledge to enter the anti-Soviet front. Von Papen had already conducted negotiations regarding the anti-Soviet Union, but said nothing definite (in diplomatic language this means the utmost definiteness). The haggling over Dantzig and the Polish corridor proceeds according to all the rules of the hucksters' art, each one enquires the price, bates and retreats, circulating through the newspapers and the radio streams of lies and threats, etc.

We point out here, by the way, that Von Papen has already succeeded in causing a scene in Lausanne by his loquacity, which aroused open protests and indignant comment from influential German bourgeois circles. No matter how flexible the formulae, no matter how fine combed the resolutions, Lausanne has once again demonstrated that capitalism driven into a blind alley by the world crisis, can find no outlet. The clash of swords and the preparations made by all partners for a solution of the question by the mailed fist reverberate above all peaceful declarations and pacifist slogans.

* * *

Imperialist France speaks in the language of the mistress of Europe. The crisis effected a regrouping of forces, considerably weakening both the United States and England. Since France was the last country to be affected by the crisis, it has weakened less than other capitalist countries and has accumulated tremendous financial resources due to the billions obtained through reparations, consequently increasing its specific weight in world politics and world economy. Thence France's new rôle. This must not be taken to mean that France has escaped the crisis and internal difficulties. France has a huge deficit of many billions, its import-export has dropped to one-half, many large French enterprises and banks have failed. Moreover, the crisis which made itself felt later than in other countries, is, on the other hand, making more rapid headway than was the case among its competitors. Still France holds a favourable position when compared to other countries. It utilises this, and because of its financial resources restricts England's activities, drives Germany hard and counterposes its policy to that of the United States.

The most outstanding peculiarity of the present period is the keen sharpening of the struggle between France and the United States. Whereas the chief combatants for world hegemony were formerly England and the United States, it would appear that England is taking a minor rôle and France moving up to front stage. The embittered struggle against the United States is the consequence of France's activity in welding a bloc against the former. Moreover, these attempts have passed beyond the borders of Europe in view of the agreement which France has concluded with Japan, aimed not only against the U.S.S.R. but against the U.S.A. as well. This does not mean that England has been pushed aside. The English bourgeoisie is adopting a more watchful, waiting position. It seeks to foment a conflict between its rivals in order to enter as arbiter of the world's destiny once again. Hence the cautious far-aimed policy of the English bourgeoisie and its constant "blocs," now with the United States against France, or with France against the United States, or its unconditional support of Japan, conditional support or conditions without support. The English bourgeoisie is manoeuvring, perfectly aware that an openly depredatory French policy must lead to an explosion. This is why England attempts to reconcile these contradictions, smooth out difficulties, prevent its opponents from growing strong—particularly her chief opponent—the United States—advancing one and then another of her temporary allies.

Thence the externally conciliatory position of MacDonald at Lausanne. Organising an offensive of European debtors against American creditors, England lurked in the background,

allowing France to play the lead in the dispute with U.S.A.

Appearing in a united front with France on the reparations question, England nevertheless endeavoured to curb the nationalistic frenzy of the French bourgeoisie.

While Herriot and Papen haggled, MacDonald drafted the theses and outlines of agreement. After his first five points had satisfied nobody, MacDonald endeavoured to draft an agreement which, according to the "Financial Times," consisted of six articles. This "pact" was :—

(1) Conclusive annulment of all further reparation payments by Germany.
(2) Taking into consideration the cessation of reparation payments, Germany agrees to pay a number of annual contributions to a sum of £150 millions sterling which will be utilised for a general fund of European financial reconstruction.
(3) In connection with the cessation of reparations the eighth section of the Versailles Treaty concerning reparations and Germany's war-guilt is annulled.
(4) Annulment of financial control over the Reichsbank and the German State railways existing at present.
(5) The present agreement not to operate until ratified by the Parliaments of the countries concerned.
(6) Powers signing the Lausanne pact to undertake responsibility not to enter upon any steps individually or collectively likely to cause a breach of general economic peace.

These six points differ from the first five in so far as they contain the sum of 3,000,000,000 marks, but the wily old equilibrist goes further. The third point is especially characteristic, according to which, it appears, that the annulment of Germany's war-guilt is to accompany the cessation of reparations.

All these points, paragraphs, pacts, agreements, declarations, etc., testify that it is extremely difficult to find a way out of the main contradictions of the Versailles system, despite the great resource and external unanimity of English diplomats.

Quite in contradistinction, Italian fascism acts aggressively, declaring through the mouth of Mussolini that the "time for these reparations and war debts is passed." Mussolini, if one believes the "Daily Express," is most pessimistically inclined with regard to the fate of capitalism. "I foresee," he said, "a long series of political, economic and military wars. War is already being waged now." The really one great fear of Mussolini is lest Europe become Bolshevised. "Only two barriers prevent the Bolshevisation of Europe—England and Italy. Italy is powerful (!), Italy is united (!), England is strong, England is united, England is disciplined." But if Italy and England are so powerful and so united, why Mussolini's gloom, as reported by the correspondent? It is because he realises the futility of the Lausanne-Geneva negotiations and foresees the oncoming threatening social disturbance. This is why, in answer to the correspondent's question, "Where are our saviours?" Mussolini morosely cries, "There are no saviours!"

Although the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, it keeps vigilant watch on how events move in Geneva and Lausanne. The American bourgeoisie, though shaken by the crisis, still hold a sufficiently thick whip over Europe. The United States knows only too well that Lausanne has decided nothing and can decide nothing, but the United States is interested in Europe's solving the crisis, for that would mean the beginning of the end of the American crisis. On the other hand, the American bourgeoisie understands that the longer the crisis prevails in Europe, the weaker its competitors become. If the crisis could be confined to Europe alone, then naturally the United States would adopt a calm, expectant position. But since the European and American crises are organically inter-linked, we observe attempts on the part of the United States to offer its recipe for saving the world from the crisis. This formula is set forth in the last message from Hoover, calculated to serve both foreign and home politics in view of the forthcoming presidential elections.

Hoover approached the economic and financial problems facing Lausanne from the Geneva end, and raises the question of partial disarmament, evoking frantic opposition, largely on the part of Japan and France. What is Mr. Hoover's programme? What is the aim of this new peacemaker? He elucidated his recipe in his five points :—

(1) The Kellogg-Briand Pact, in which we all participate, can mean but one thing—that the peoples of the world have agreed to use arms for defensive purposes only.
(2) Limitations must be effected by a broad general decrease in armaments, as well as by augmenting the comparative defence forces through decreasing offensive forces.
(3) Armaments throughout the world are invariably connected with one another and generally speaking this relation must be preserved when the cuts are carried out.
(4) Decrease in armaments must be real and earnest. Primarily it must afford an economic alleviation.

(5) There are three problems at hand demanding consideration : land forces, air forces and naval forces, all interlinked. No part of the proposal which I am making can be separated from any other part.

These five points of Hoover are worthy of MacDonald's five points. Hoover has, by this message, linked Lausanne and Geneva, given "friendly counsel" to the imperialist powers to find the lacking billions through limitation of armaments. This American bombshell evoked a storm of fury in the French and Japanese press. The French newspapers openly wrote : The time has passed when European powers listen in utter submission to the proposals of the United States. The Japanese, for their part, reacted to this suggestion with open scepticism. They announced that the proposition in question is unacceptable to countries which may later become the opponents of the United States, and that the "prerequisite for accepting the Hoover Plan is a guarantee of Japanese security from attack on the part of China or the U.S.S.R." Thus Japan, following the example of its French allies, advances the boomerang of a "security guarantee," to justify its frantic armaments and rapacious attack upon China. After the first volley against the Hoover proposal England and France suddenly discovered "the healthy core" in the Hoover manoeuvre. Now the question was not that of rejecting the pacifist message of Hoover. Now upon the agenda is the question of "careful and serious study," that is, its burial, only by means of a more honourable order. The answer of Baldwin is equal to the Hoover epistle. So far as land forces are concerned, said Baldwin, the English Government "agrees to a considerable extent with the proposals of Hoover" ; concerning the Fleet there appears on the scene "responsibility laid upon the British Grand Fleet in connection with the great distances between the points it guards," therefore Baldwin proposes a plan to suit England against the Hoover plan. No doubt France says the same regarding land forces as England regarding the Fleet; and Japan, "giving way" a little, says she agrees with the two preceding speakers. The story of the three blind mice starts all over again.

The Lausanne-Geneva game with marked cards naturally could not be played without the most active and energetic participation of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals. Whenever the representatives of imperialist powers gather at Geneva or Lausanne to discuss current affairs, the Second and Amsterdam Internationals arrange a meet there. The majority of the "social-fascist" leaders travel there at the expense of their governments and combine business (contact with the world powers-that-be) with pleasure (ministerial expense accounts). Since both the Second and Amsterdam Internationals have never followed any other policy but that of the League of Nations, all these internal contradictions of the League of Nations find their reflection among the past and future "socialist" ministers. The German social-fascists support Brüning and Von Papen in the question of annulling reparations, and the French-Belgian socialists favour the Versailles Treaty and now support Herriot as cordially and fully as they formerly did Poincaré and Tardieu, on this and other questions.

It is natural enough that the heroes of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals have their own specially-agreed-upon language, so as to veil imperialistic leanings with socialistic ornmentations, but this does not affect the truth of the matter. To begin with, the socialist press and party live and sustain themselves on Geneva and Lausanne. They pin all their hope in the League of Nations, which they regard as *their own* institution (true, with shortcomings requiring perfecting), to be used for the welfare of humanity. The Second and Amsterdam Internationals manifest a touching unity and accord when it is a question of the struggle against Bolshevism, or breaking strikes, or the passing of general, meaningless resolutions. But the moment the matter concerns any question on which the imperialists differ, then the leaders of the Second International immediately show their true imperialist colours. Most characteristic in this respect is the report printed in the last issue of the "Socialistichesky Vestnik" ("Socialist Herald") on the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Second International which discussed the question of reparations and disarmament. The very arguments brought forward by the Germans and French were identical with those proffered by Von Papen and Herriott.

The formulae of the Second International (international stabilisation of money, punishment for valuta speculation, international public works, adoption of measures against the export of capital, improvement and consolidation of credit, reconsideration of all customs tariffs in a united plan, formation of a European bureau for purchase, import and distribution of grain products, international agreement on a forty-hour working week, etc.) are just about as effective and "helpful" in finding a way out of the crisis as a plaster against an eclipse of the sun. The tasks of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals are to inculcate and buoy up the belief in the masses that Lausanne and Geneva "can solve" the world problems. Therefore the social-fascists of all countries are engaged now in extensive agitation-

propaganda work around the Lausanne-Geneva concoction.

It suffices to quote the following excerpt from an article written by Leon Blum, leader of the French "Socialist" Party and a "socialist" millionaire, in order to understand where international reformism is trying to lead the masses:

> "International collaboration does and can find only incomplete expression in the condition of present social structure. But the leaders of governments gathered in Lausanne are the only promulgators and representatives who can do this, as far as it is possible. Let them listen to the 'voices from everywhere,' to this appeal and to the almost unanimous prayers. Let them rise to the heights of the task whose difficulties merely add to its greatness."

This declaration is intended to divert the attention of the masses from their daily needs. Its purpose is to concentrate attention on Lausanne and Geneva. The meaning of this declamation is as follows: Workers, don't struggle, don't take your fate into your own hands. Granted that the representatives of governments gathered at Lausanne are not the real representatives of the people, still everything depends on them, they can and will decide everything.

The Second International pursues the same policy with regard to disarmament. It favours "disarmament" in general, but is opposed to the proposals advanced by the delegation from the U.S.S.R., the delegation from the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which proposes a *genuine* disarmament. Hoover has just suggested a plan for partial disarmament, but it is quite obvious that the French socialists will oppose and the German socialists favour it, for the former as well as the latter are most concerned with their bourgeois fatherland.

Recently, Vandervelde, replying to our criticism of the Japanese socialists, declared that they are not attached to the Second International, and even were this the case, the Second International could not hold itself responsible for one of its section's failure to adhere to the correct policy. By this Vandervelde meant to shake off the question raised by the international Communist press of the complete and wholehearted support by Japanese socialists of "their" imperialism. If the Second International refuses to be held responsible for its Japanese section, does it not take responsibility for the French, Belgian, German or English sections? In what does the activity of these sections differ from that of the Japanese? The Japanese socialists are now doing what was done by the French, German, Austrian and Belgian socialists during the world war. Or perhaps the Second International does not answer for *even one* of its sections?

No, the Second and Amsterdam Internationals cannot brush away responsibility for either the policies of their sections during the world war or for the Versailles policy, the League of Nations policy, the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, the reparations policy, or preparation for war against the Soviet Union. The imperialistic face of the Second International is becoming bolder from day to day and no matter how eloquent Mr. Vandervelde, he will not be able to drown hard, bitter facts in perfervid rhetoric.

* * *

Lausanne and Geneva are stepping-stones in the general crisis of capitalism and the growing world economic crisis. Contradictions rise at every step. Each of the powers wants to shift the current of events in his favour. Each wants to deceive his neighbour, to creep upon him from the rear, and all of them together are recurring to discussion of war against the U.S.S.R. with growing frequency.

A "solution" to the crisis by war lures the imperialists. Some of them talk about it openly, others conceal their bestial hatred under a mask of hypocrisy, but continue to stake the heads of tens of millions of people at Lausanne and Geneva. This is the real meaning behind the transparent insinuations of Von Papen, who promises France compensation in return for cancellation of reparations. Not one of the participants in the Lausanne-Geneva thieves' kitchen desires to disarm, not one of them considers it possible to solve the economic and financial problems as of yore, yet everything proceeds as heretofore. Every partner makes pacifist declarations and continues to arm at frantic speed . . .

Lausanne and Geneva are a chessboard where the game is played according to all the regulations of the diplomatic art. It is a gambling den, where marked cards are dealt, but unlike "decent" gambling dens which give those who use marked cards a good hiding and throw them out—marked cards are legalised at Lausanne and Geneva, where they are considered the last word in "democratic" diplomacy.

The Lausanne-Geneva haggling have clarified a number of things previously unclear to many:

(1) The Young Plan has collapsed and the internal contradictions of the Versailles system have strengthened.

(2) The boasts of the Von Papen Government and the national-socialists to the effect that they would not make the slightest retreat to France were shown to be bluff. The German bourgeoisie is ready to sell the German people, wholesale and retail, at a

suitable compensation (proposal of Von Papen for a military alliance with France, etc.).

(3) France succeeded in uniting all Germany's creditors and administering a rebuff to Germany's appetite for armaments.

(4) Great Britain succeeded in uniting all America's creditors, but America, already prepared to retreat on debts, connects this with the limitation of armaments.

(5) The united front of American debtors is extremely fragile and temporary, i.e., the internal contradictions between the debtors are extremely sharp and may destroy this formal agreement at any moment.

The working class must keep watch over the Lausanne-Geneva gamblers. It must clearly realise that the Second and Amsterdam Internationals play an active rôle in the preparations for a new joint extermination of peoples. It must keep tab on the Lausanne-Geneva diplomatic word-plays and bear in mind that the fate of peoples is not decided in Geneva or in Lausanne, but will be *decided in the factories and plants, in the class struggle against the bourgeoisie.*

While dickering and auctioning goes on at Lausanne, where the German loud-speaker, Von Papen, offers compensation (at whose expense?) for the annulment of reparations, the reaction continues to muster its forces with frantic speed, and prepares new attacks against the working class. Wages have been decreased again in Germany, unemployment benefit has been cut down, the fascist storm-divisions are murdering workers on the streets and the Communist Party and the Red T.U. Opposition which head the struggle of the masses against the onslaught of capitalism are placed under the emergency ban.

Unemployment and poverty are waxing fast in France, England, the United States and Japan. Wages and the living standard are steadily declining. The whole international background reeks of powder. Under cover of pacifist talk the bourgeoisie is preparing to crash against the U.S.S.R. and bleed the proletariat.

Where is the world heading? ask the state officials of various countries. What will happen? asks the Philistine, terrified by the magnitude of approaching events. "There are no saviours," groans the leader of Italian fascism. The International Communist Party knows *where the capitalist world is heading*, it knows *what will happen, what will save* the toiling masses from hunger, poverty, unemployment, war and extirpation. It is Revolution, Proletarian Dictatorship—*INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM.*

P.S.—This article was already set when the telegraph informed the whole world that agreement had been reached at Lausanne. In what consists this agreement? Germany receives a three-year moratorium, upon the expiration of which she must pay three milliards of marks. Germany is to issue bonds through the Basle Bank of International Settlements. The duration of these is to be 15 years,and the general date of expiration 37 years. The final payment includes also the contributions due for the last year of the moratorium and the payment of the Young Plan debt, the Dawes Plan, and also the compensation payments for the issue of the Belgian marks.* The moment of the issue of the bonds is to be fixed by the Basle Bank of International Settlements. Bonds not paid up within 15 years are to be annulled.

The agreement reached with such difficulty in reality defers the whole question three years, in so far as Germany only commences to pay in 1935. Germany has retreated on all questions of political principle (exclusive war guilt, Polish corridor, equal rights in armaments, etc.).

On the other hand the entire agreement bears a temporary character to the extent that it depends on a retreat of America on inter-allied debts. It is no accident that the French press emphasises that no French Parliament will ratify the Lausanne pact if the United States does not proceed to annul the debts.

The Lausanne agreement has altered nothing in the international situation, and cannot serve as the starting point of the way out of the crisis.

Everything remains as it was prior to Lausanne; the mistress of the situation is the world economic crisis and not her bourgeois exorcisers.

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*Marks issued in Belgium during the German occupation.

J. T. MURPHY'S DESERTION TO THE CLASS ENEMY

By J. SHIELDS.

THE renegades from the ranks of Communism, the camp of the enemies of the working class, have received another recruit in the person of J. T. Murphy, who has deserted from the Communist Party of Great Britain.

On May 8th, 1932, Murphy, who had been a member of the Central Committee of the Party in Britain, addressed a letter to the Political Bureau, which declared :—

> "It is perfectly clear to me . . . that there is no place for me in the C.P.G.B. at this stage of its history . . . . Therefore from to-day I cease to be a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain."

What is "this stage" of the Party's history which Murphy refers to? It is the very moment when the whole attack of capital against the working class, and, above all, against the Communist Party, is being rapidly developed and takes on a more pronounced form. It is the period when the Party is mobilising the working masses for the struggle against the economic and political offensive of the bourgeoisie. It is the period when the Party is leading a tremendous fight against imperialist war and the danger of intervention menacing the U.S.S.R. Particularly at the present moment, when the struggle needs to be strengthened against the enormously swollen stream of poisonous war propaganda which is being poured out, to uncover and expose the feverish war preparations of the bourgeoisie which they seek to mask in every way, Murphy takes the road of desertion and goes over bag and baggage to the camp of the enemy.

This is no chance occurrence. Almost always, at a time of a sharpening of the class struggle, the opportunist elements in the labour movement have lifted up their heads and have preached the policy of capitulation, the line of counter-revolution and have finally openly deserted from the revolutionary class fight.

What was the political line of Murphy which directly led to his open treachery to the working-class movement?

The standpoint which Murphy has taken up has been accompanied by strenuous efforts on his part to introduce his opportunist line into the ranks of the working class with regard to the question of the fight against war and intervention, and the problem of the two world systems, the system of capitalism and that of socialist economy in the U.S.S.R. Here he has deliberately resorted to attempting to introduce exceedingly wrong and dangerous views and conclusions which objectively help the policy of the bourgeoisie. His first effort in this direction was contained in a letter which he wrote to the Party Secretariat on March 10th, where he formulated his position on the question of the fight against war and intervention and for the revolutionary way out of the crisis. In the position of Murphy, the real essence and the chief method of this struggle is a struggle for the granting of Soviet credits from British capitalism. Despite every effort made by the Party leadership to convince Murphy of its incorrectness, he further developed and elaborated it, and later embodied it in an article in the April issue of the "Communist Review," the theoretical monthly organ of the Party, where he acted in the capacity of editor. The following passages from the article in question express the policy which Murphy advocates :—

> "It is not enough to shout, 'Defend the Soviet Union,' 'Stop the transport of munitions.' We must do more. We must also advance the demand for credits to the Soviet Union. We must fight to work on the Five-Year Plan of Socialist construction . . . The more the daily life of the working class of this country becomes *integrated* with the industrialisation of the Soviet Union, *even through bourgeois channels*, the more difficult it will be for the British Government to sever relations . . .
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> "This is fighting against the war. This is waging the class war."

Here we see openly advocated the integrating of the Socialist and capitalist systems, which Murphy declares is to be brought about by the Party raising the demand for credits to the Soviet Union. This also, according to Murphy, is the way to prevent intervention and is waging the class war.

He puts forward the proposition that the socialist and capitalist systems should be "integrated" at a time when capitalist economy is suffering a severe crisis through its whole system, while socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. is successfully advancing in triumph. It is due to the latter fact that capitalism is now developing for armed attack on the Soviet Union. What significance, therefore, can Murphy's formulation serve other than to cover up the capitalist preparations for armed attack on the U.S.S.R.? With his talk of "integration" he seeks to dampen down the working-class fight at the very moment when the whole situation demands its utmost intensification for the smashing of the plans of the war-making imperialists.

He conveys the idea that capitalism does not want to attack, and thus disarms the workers. This line, far from assisting the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan in the U.S.S.R., actually helps forward the war plans of the imperialists for its destruction.

This position is quite on a par with Murphy's attitude on the question of credits for the Soviet Union. After he left the Party, Murphy attempted to excuse his cowardly desertion and treachery by writing an article in the "New Leader" and the "Forward," which the I.L.P. had no hesitation in placing at his disposal. This article, which is entitled "Why I left the Communist Party," makes a pretence of changing one or two formulations in the lines written in the "Communist Review." In no way, however, does it make any alteration in his basic standpoint, but instead uses this for the purpose of attacking the Communist Party, contriving to make it appear with knavish trickery that the Party is against credits for the Soviet Union. Here he seeks to pose as a defender of the Soviet Union, and to trick the workers into the belief that he favours the struggle for credits while the Party is against it. Murphy maintains that the Communist Party should place in the very forefront and centre of its present activity an appeal to the bourgeoisie to grant credits to the Soviet Union. Put in the way which Murphy wants, the demand for credits for the Soviet Union is transformed into a means for sidetracking the revolutionary fight against intervention, and for damping down the mobilisation of the working class for the stopping of the manufacture and transport of munitions and war materials. In short, Murphy transforms the slogan of credits into a substitute for the class struggle, into a means for disarming the working class.

What is the attitude taken up by the Party on the question of credits? This question is of great importance for the working class and has to be made perfectly clear. At the present time the workers in Britain are all for the unhampered development of Soviet trading relations. They are in favour of the Soviet Union being given whatever credits it desires.

The British bourgeoisie, on the other hand, is pursuing a policy of sharpening attack against trade relations with the U.S.S.R., against the granting of credits. Despite the fact of a certain section of British capitalists being in favour of trade with Russia, the opposite is the attitude which dominates the policy of Government. Against these restricting and dislocating efforts of the bourgeoisie, the Communist Party calls on the working class to take up struggle and to meet these attacks with the widest possible protests. The Labour Party and the I.L.P., of course, take up the direct opposite position. When the Conservatives made a rabid attack on Soviet trade relations recently in the House of Commons, the Labour M.P.s acquiesced in this by their careful silence during the debates, thus indicating their attitude towards the interventionists. The Communist Party, however, whilst reacting plainly and clearly against the attempts to break off trading relations, does not, however, make the slogan of credits a slogan of the Party. The Party is not against the demand for credits to the Soviet Union, on the contrary it supports demands for this which are put forward by the trade unions, unemployed organisations, and similar mass working-class bodies.

But the main aim of the Party is to mobilise the workers for fighting against, not appealing to, the bourgeoisie. The Party, therefore, supports such demands as credits for the Soviet Union, which are raised by working-class organisations, and uses these demands for also mobilising the workers in the class fight, for developing the struggle against the capitalist offensive, for bringing about working-class action for the stopping of munitions and the smashing of the plans for intervention, for carrying forward the fight for the revolutionary way out of the crisis through the overthrow of British capitalism.

It is just this line of policy which Murphy has deserted, and which he now seeks to distort in the eyes of the workers. He deliberately belittles the attempts of the Party to mobilise the workers against the transport of munitions. Making use of the strike weapon for the stopping of munitions is sneered at by Murphy, just at the time when the police are arresting and sentencing comrades for attempting to do it. Is this not the most glaring treachery to the working class?

No wonder the bourgeois press at once hastened to shower praise upon Murphy, and to use him for its attacks against the Party. The bourgeois daily organ, the "Manchester Guardian," hurried forward to describe him as being "one of the most remarkable men in the Communist movement" and his viewpoint as "this not illogical adviec'. '

The renegades from the ranks of Communism also hastened to support Murphy against the Party and to use his expulsion for an outburst of abuse against the Communist International. The "Socialistiche Arbeiterzeitung," the organ of the "left" social-democrats in Germany, after giving Murphy a pat on the back and declaring that Trotsky "emphasises, among others, demands similar to those proposed by Murphy in his article," goes on to characterise his expulsion from the Party as "another example of the

devastating effect of the domination of the Stalin fraction in the Comintern apparatus." The "Workers' Age," the weekly organ of the counter-revolutionary Lovestonite group in America, announces that :—

> "This amazing treatment of one of the oldest, most capable and most experienced leaders of the British Communist Party focusses sharp attention upon the intolerable régime now dominating the world Communist movement."

Murphy cowardly deserted from the Party because the Party prevented him from carrying through the ideas of the enemy in the ranks of the working class. The Party has always helped every comrade who made mistakes to rectify and correct such mistakes and grasp the correct working-class viewpoint. The Communist Party is founded upon the principle of democratic centralism. This means that every Party member has the free and unfettered right to express his opinions on any point or subject, but that once a decision has been arrived at by a majority on any question, then every Communist is expected to abide by and actively carry out that decision. Murphy did not even wait for a decision being taken, but ran out of the Party. The whole Party unanimously condemned him.

The Party must draw all the necessary lessons and conclusions arising from the question of Murphy. The whole of the Party membership and the workers must be made perfectly clear as to the full meaning of his "theories" and their implications. This must not be done in an abstract way but the explanatory campaign must be closely related to the carrying out of the immediate concrete tasks in connection with the fight against war and intervention, against the capitalist offensive, and the struggle for the revolutionary way out of the crisis. The Party must ensure that strict control is exercised over the theoretical organ of the Party, the "Communist Review," in future, and must sharpen the fight against opportunism wherever it manifests itself. Decisive efforts must also be made to immediately develop and raise the ideological level of the Party, a task which hitherto has not received adequate attention. Finally, the Party requires to secure a greater concentration of its efforts on the carrying into effect the resolution of the Central Committee on the tasks connected with building the Party in the factories, work in the trade unions, amongst the unemployed. In all this work there must be emphasised very clearly the *sharp differences* which exist between our revolutionary policy and methods and the rôle and attitude of the reformists. This is the way to the further strengthening of the authority and influence of the Party amongst the masses and to the rapid shattering of the opportunist views that the deserter Murphy and similar renegades stand for.

THE JUNE EVENTS IN CHILE

By Sinani.

THE information available on the recent events in Chile is still mainly based upon reports of the bourgeois telegraph agencies and correspondents, but even these reports show with sufficient clarity that the events have developed far beyond the framework of the "pronunciamento" common to the South American and Caribbean countries.

The fundamental and most important feature of the latest events is the deep revolutionary mass movement, particularly of the workers and urban petty bourgeoisie, which did not, however, have a revolutionary leadership and was therefore utilised by the opposing cliques of the ruling classes.

Essentially these events appear as follow: President Montero's Government, elected in the autumn of 1931, after the downfall of the six years' dictatorship of Ibanez, was overthrown following upon a number of unsuccessful conspiracies, by the Davila-Grove clique.

This clique consisted both of bourgeois-landlord leaders who are closely associated with imperialism (Davila himself, for instance, was Ibanez' Ambassador to the United States) and of petty bourgeois elements (such as Colonel Grove) who reflected not only the discontent of a section of the urban petty bourgeoisie, but also to some extent the growing revolutionary fermentation among the working class. With the direct support of the disaffected elements of the petty bourgeois army officers, this clique succeeded, with the aid of extensive demagogy, in utilising in its interests also the movement of the toiling masses of the cities. The coup d'état was carried out mainly by the air forces which demonstrated over the Palace of the President and Government their readiness to bomb them. The army supported

the air forces and refused to defend the Government. The population of Santiago demonstrated its sympathy with the revolutionists in the streets of the city. The revolution met with some belated opposition on the part of a section of the navy, or to be more exact, of its aristocratic officers (the "mutiny" of the destroyer, "Admiral Lattore"), but they, too, soon came to terms with the rebels. President Montero escaped to Argentine on an airplane with the obvious connivance of the "revolutionary" Government.

Seeking to utilise the support of the masses, at least for the time necessary for its consolidation, and to exploit the revolutionary sentiments in its interest, the Davila-Grove Government, benefiting by the experience of international fascism, engaged in extensive anti-imperialist and even anti-capitalist social-demagogy, and proclaimed the establishment of a "Socialist Republic of Chile." This demagogy alarmed even a large section of the imperialist press at first, though the figure of Davila, who is closely associated with United States imperialism, should have served as a sufficient guarantee that the new Government would in reality faithfully observe the interests of imperialism and of the Chilean landlords and bourgeoisie. A few days later it became sufficiently clear that Davila had no intention of going beyond vague promises and demagogic attacks against imperialism. The Government of the "Socialist Republic of Chile" not only repudiated all charges of "bolshevism," "communism" and of an intention to repeat the "Russian experiment," but announced its intention to mercilessly suppress the Communist Party of Chile. The imperialist press then regained its peace of mind —the introduction of "socialism" was in safe hands.

No sooner did it announce the intention to nationalise all industry—which would have struck a blow at foreign, particularly American, capital, than the Government explained that its intention was not to "nationalise" the existing enterprises, but to create new Government enterprises and to assure them of "co-operation and support." Translated into ordinary language this meant that Davila's Government had no intention of taking up the struggle against the so-called "Cosach" (Compania Selitra Chilena), whose capital is controlled chiefly by American business interests, especially the Guggenheim Trust, which also controls the production of copper, Chile's second most important export product. The fight against the dictatorship of the "Cosach" and for its dissolution, supported by England, represented one of the most important issues of the "national" petty bourgeois opposition to the Montero Government (this was the main election plank in the campaign of Montero's opponent, Alessandri, for the Presidency). At the same time, to the working masses, the demand for the dissolution of the "Cosach" which would have led to the liquidation of the most outstanding and hated form of imperialist monopoly (the actual monopoly of the United States, in the production of nitrates would have continued, of course, even after the dissolution of the "Cosach"), was one of the most easily understood concrete anti-imperialist slogans. On this paramount question Davila's Government showed that despite the "revolution" the continuity of the Governmental policy has been fully preserved and that the interests of imperialism in Chile, primarily of the United States, were in no danger.

The same fate befell another anti-imperialist "intention" of the new Government, that of "nationalising" the Central Bank, whose capital belongs mostly to the imperialists, and of reorganising it into a "State Bank of Chile." However, Davila's Government has not gone beyond this "intention" and the threat to take over the foreign capital of the bank with compensation to the owners.

One of the most important issues of the "revolution" was the maintenance of the value of the Chilean peso, whose catastrophic decline has already resulted in the dropping of the gold standard and in runs on the banks, with a view to securing at least silver money. Thus, on the one day of April 7, 1932, the Central Bank paid out over a million pesos in silver, this leading to the discontinuation of the exchange of the paper peso, anti-Governmental demonstrations and the resignation of the Cabinet. Davila's Government announced that in order to create a gold fund to secure the peso, all deposits in foreign currency in the national and foreign banks would be taken over compulsorily at the rate of the paper peso. No sooner did it proclaim and popularise this measure to "save" the peso than the Government, yielding to pressure from the imperialists, modestly "explained" that the foreign currency deposits of the foreigners would be preserved intact, while the bulk of the foreign currency deposited in the banks of Chile belonged to foreigners.

The capitulation—if it is possible at all to speak of a "capitulation"—of Davila's "revolutionary" and even "socialist" Government before imperialism was complete on all the most important questions; it was actually prepared to continue the policy of the Ibanez and Montero Governments while covering it up more cleverly and subtly by much anti-imperialist demagogy.

Similar "flexibility" has been displayed by Davila on the question of internal policy as well.

Thus, the decree dissolving the religious orders (for instance, the Jesuits) which are hated by the masses, was "modified," that is, simply rescinded almost immediately after its publication. The promise of material aid to the workers whose wages have dropped below 50 per cent. of the 1929 level, and to the unemployed—the number of workers employed in the nitrate, copper and coal industries alone declined from 90,000 in 1929 to 29,000 in 1932—was limited to Ministerial declamations about "the establishment of justice with regard to the demand of the long-suffering proletariat."

Under the pressure of the masses the Government has been forced, however, to dissolve the fascist "civil guard" which was created during last year's mutiny of the Chilean Navy and consisted of the sons of the ruling classes, and of the intelligentsia, and aimed at the suppression of the revolutionary mass movement. The voluntary "Foreign Legion" organised "to protect life and property of foreigners" has also been dissolved. This essentially covers the entire "positive" policy of Davila's "socialist Government." The demagogy and promises of "freedom" were necessary, only in order to gain the support of the masses, at the time of the coup d'état, and for the consolidation of the new power. This was inevitably followed by repressions and the restoration of terrorism against the revolutionary labour organisations which began, as stated above, primarily against the communists. From "socialism," covering up the overthrow, Davila's Government pursued a firm policy of restoring the "normal" bourgeois-landlord régime.

Meantime, the movement of the masses, particularly of the workers, grew. The very character of the Governmental demagogy itself shows that the revolutionary fermentation of the masses was sufficiently deep and widespread. In any case, it is hardly to be supposed that Davila would have himself raised the issue of "socialism," had not this slogan been sufficiently popular among the masses as a slogan of the revolutionary solution of the crisis. Davila's anti-imperialist demagogy did not, of course, signify his preparedness or actual intention to fight against the power of imperialism, but the very fact of this demagogy was possible only in an atmosphere of a growing anti-imperialist mass movement. The publication of the decree dissolving the religious orders indicates the anti-clerical sentiments of the masses.

The imperialist press contains very scanty information regarding the labour movement at the time of the revolution. However, even this press publishes accounts of numerous labour meetings demanding that the Government arm a Labour Red Guard to be controlled by the labour organisations. At the same time some of the labour meetings, apparently led by the reformists, demanded the participation of workers' representatives in the Government.

The same demand was advanced by a number of trade unions. Reflecting the tendency of the reformist and renegade leaders to secure lucrative seats in the Government, these demands for the participation of labour representatives in the Government also expressed the growth of the political activity of the masses even though they still largely follow the reformists.

After this article had been set, details of the creation of Soviets of workers' deputies in Santiago and later in most large towns of Chile, on the initiative of the Communist Party, were received.

Representatives of the Socialist, Anarchist and renegade Party organisations and groups also entered the Santiago Soviet. Not being in a position to win the mass of the workers of the Soviet, the anarchists and renegades (Idalgists) left it. The Santiago Soviet was closely connected with the masses, organised several powerful demonstrations, and rapidly became the most important organ of the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses. So far there are no details of the activities of Soviets in the provinces.

Exceptionally favourable conditions were created for the speedy development of a truly revolutionary mass movement by the entire circumstances of the coup d'état, misrepresented as a revolution, by the complete freedom of organisation and action existing during the first days of the new Government, and by its extensive "socialist" demagogy.

With the growth of the revolutionary movement on the one hand, and the developing right policy of Davila on the other, the internal differences within the new Government became more and more intensified.

Its left, petty bourgeois wing, expressing the sentiments of the petty bourgeois masses and led by Grove and Matte, was apparently not only prepared for verbal demonstrations against imperialism, but also for a certain fight, and was therefore dissatisfied with Davila, who, according to Grove, taught that "the socialist reorganisation of Chile is possible without determined pressure upon the capitalists."

After the internal struggle within the Government the left wing succeeded in excluding Davila and replacing him in the post of President by Col. Grove, the main organiser of the military overthrow of President Montero. Thus, the petty bourgeois elements of the Governmental clique captured power. However, they did not have any

clear political programme, any definite plan of action, or any mass organisations. Not being a party in the proper sense of the word, the Grove-Matte group remained a clique typical of all the countries of South America. Being revolutionary in the petty-bourgeois sense and prepared to extend the anti-imperialist struggle to the point of limiting the exploiting classes in some ways, this petty bourgeois grouping, however, was definitely incapable of conducting a truly revolutionary struggle for its aims. We do not know how sincere Grove-Matte were in their "socialist" sentiments, but they were, in any case, anti-proletarian and therefore anti-revolutionary and anti-socialist. Between petty-bourgeois "socialism" in power and the counter-revolution there is not much more than one step.

The very first act of Grove's Government was to again proclaim its "socialist" character. But being, in reality, not only petty-bourgeois but also anti-proletarian, and seeking to refute the charges of "radicalism" and "extremism," it immediately announced its determination not to allow any communist "interference" in its affairs, to conduct a resolute fight against the C.P. and to put down with an "iron hand" every attempt at "communist disorder." This, in itself, predecided its destiny not only as a "socialist" Government but as any Government, for without the support of the working masses, without the support of the Communist Party, even the most "radical" petty-bourgeois grouping cannot fight against the bourgeois-landlord and imperialist counter-revolution.

Despite the vigorous and persistent "advice" of the imperialist representatives, Grove's Government confirmed the decree on the forcible exchange of all foreign currency deposits belonging both to natives and foreigners. In the capacity of main Governmental commissioner for the nitrate industry, was appointed Morgado, who is known as a determined advocate of the dissolution of "Cosach." Grove's Government again announced its intention to reorganise the Central Bank into a State Bank of Chile, and to confiscate all foreign deposits.

All of these measures, had they actually been carried out, would have primarily affected American imperialism. On the basis of these announced measures some newspapers (for instance, the German, and also the American "Daily Worker") were already prepared to simplify the situation and see in Grove a British agent, reducing the entire struggle between Davila and Grove to Anglo-American rivalry. That this simplification, which ignores the class struggle in Chile itself, is completely incorrect is sufficiently indicated even by the sharp statement in the British House of Commons of Assistant Foreign Secretary Eden who, replying to a question, declared that the British Government would certainly refuse to recognise Grove's Government, and would take the most resolute measures of repression to compensate British capital for the losses resulting from the measures taken by the Government in Chile.

Simultaneously with these more determined, but still far from revolutionary anti-imperialist actions, Grove's Government took certain measures to mitigate the sufferings of the masses. Thus it introduced fixed prices of foodstuffs and established Governmental control over their sale. The unemployment relief which existed previously under Montero was extended; according to the Labour Department 250,000 unemployed in nine cities were given food twice per day.

In order to secure the gold covering of the peso the jewellery stores were searched and "excessive" supplies of gold were removed to the reserve funds of the bank. All the foreign currency and gold, found in the money exchanges were forcibly exchanged (at the rate of the paper peso) and removed with the same object in view.

To devise measures for the "socialist" reorganisation of Chile, the Government set up a "National Socialist Economic Council," with representatives of the reformist labour organisations, a fact which the imperialist press never tired of emphasising as proof of the "danger" threatening the property of the imperialists in Chile. This Council, which had an advisory character, met in the Senate building. To acquaint the country with the socialist programme (which did not really exist) it was decided to make extensive use of the radio. A special commission was appointed to adapt the theatres, cinema houses, radio studios and the other artistic shops to the "needs and interests of the people."

Such are the fundamental measures of Grove's Government known to us, which were represented as "socialist." Despite all their half-heartedness they were nevertheless greeted by the masses with tremendous enthusiasm. Immense demonstrations of many thousands of people took place in Santiago. The labour meetings and demonstrations welcomed the new Government and expressed their readiness to fight for socialism. The representatives of the socialist organisations of Peru, Equador and Columbia who arrived in Chile addressed the labour meetings (according to the "New York Times"), greeting the new "socialist" régime and declaring that the workers of their countries would support it. These speeches aroused tremendous enthusiasm and were regarded as evidence of international revolutionary solidarity.

Despite the announced intention of Grove's Government to fight the C.P. it did not dare to resort to repressions, and the communists not only openly addressed all the meetings and demonstrations but demanded halls for their work. The communist students occupied the university and demanded participation in the Government (according to a report of the "New York Times").

There can be no doubt that the capture of the power by the left "socialist" Government of Grove created a large number of illusions among the working masses. These illusions were strengthened not only by its "socialist" demagogy but by all the reformist socialist and renegade (for instance, the Idalgo group) organisations. We do not possess sufficient data on the work carried out at this time by the C.P. No doubt the illusions of the working masses regarding the socialist character of the Grove Government hindered the work of the C.P. in a certain measure in mobilising the proletariat for a struggle for a real revolution and the creation of a revolutionary worker-peasant Soviet Government. Nevertheless, as the subsequent events revealed, the communists marched at the head of the masses, and they alone being in the leadership of the masses, were able to offer resistance at the time of the advance of the reaction.

The Grove-Matte Government originated in the process of a struggle between the cliques of the ruling classes, was connected with the masses of the petty bourgeoisie, ruined and distressed by the crisis, and succeeded in gaining through the reformists and nationalists, the support of considerable sections of the workers. It was not a revolutionary Government, but its very rise to power against the bourgeois landlord cliques, closely connected with the imperialists, greatly facilitated and accelerated the development of the revolutionary activity of the masses, and led to the deepening and sharpening of the revolutionary class struggle. Soviets were created already as organs of power, the elements of the Dual Power were to hand. The Grove-Matte Government could be only a transitional Government which had to be overthrown, either by the rebellious masses under the hegemony of the proletariat and under the Soviets led by the C.P., or by the bourgeois-landlord and imperialist counter-revolution. It is impossible to balance between the fight against imperialism or communism without very soon losing equilibrium.

The weakness of the C.P., and of the revolutionary unions of Chile, which only recently emerged from six years of underground existence, their insufficient influence over the masses of the working class, large sections of which have been captured by the reformists and socialists, the weak connections between the communists and the recently organised Soviets and the army and the almost complete absence of connections with the toiling masses of the peasantry, these were the basic causes which permitted the forces of the counter-revolution to organise themselves more rapidly than the forces of the worker-peasant revolution.

The growth of the revolutionary movement made the reaction hasten its actions. The Grove-Matte Government was overthrown by a new military coup organised by Davila whose counter-revolutionary activity, after his removal from the Government, was regarded by the latter with equanimity. There can be no doubt that this time Davila was backed, not only by the landlords and bourgeoisie of Chile, but also by all the imperialists.

Grove and Matte did not succeed and were unable to organise any serious resistance, were arrested and exiled to the isolated Juan Fernandez Island in the Pacific, the usual place of exile from Chile. The subsequent arrest of 30 officers of the carabinier units testifies to certain fluctuations in some army detachments, but nothing definite is known about this.

Effective resistance to the reaction was offered only by the working masses. In response to the overthrow of Grove's Government and in opposition to the new "socialist" Government of Davila, a strike was declared by the railwaymen, tramwaymen, and slaughter house workers, a large section of the copper miners and copper smelters, as well as by the workers of a number of smaller industries. Armed clashes between the workers and Governmental troops occurred in Santiago, the capital of Chile. To suppress labour ("communist") unrest, troops were sent also to a number of provincial towns. Bloody clashes occurred also in Valparaiso and Concepcion. According to the imperialist press, these strikes, such as the strike of the 5,000 workers of the Guggenheim copper mill near Rankagua, where troops have been sent, had an "anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist character."

It is indisputable that a leading part was played in this struggle by the Soviets, but so far we have no detailed information.

To suppress the strike wave and the revolutionary movement — unfortunately we have no knowledge whatsoever of the events in the villages — Davila's new Government proclaimed martial law throughout the country. The trains were manned by special military detachments. All open-air meetings were banned. Meetings on enclosed premises can be only held with police permission issued 24 hours before the actual meeting. Anybody moving in the streets of Santiago

after 10 p.m. will be fired upon without warning. Anyone "agitating the masses" is subject to arrest, trial within 24 hours and shooting. The Communist Party has been outlawed and over 500 communists, including the responsible leaders of the Party, have been arrested. It may be assumed that the revolutionary trade unions have also been suppressed. According to the latest reports of the bourgeois telegraph agencies in Chile "everything is quiet" in the country.

This is how Davila's "socialist" programme appears in its second edition. It is quite clear that it does not contain any distinction of principle from the "socialist" demands of Davila's first Government. It is nothing but a second and "improved" edition in which all the i's are dotted and the t's are crossed. The "socialist" label can no longer deceive anyone as to the real character of Davila's Government as a Government of the bourgeois-landlord reaction and imperialist oppression.

During the last year, since the summer of 1931, Chile has been a centre of important revolutionary events for the third time. In the summer of 1931 Ibanez' dictatorship was overthrown, not in consequence of a struggle of the ruling cliques but as a result of a revolutionary mass movement, though the power remained in the hands connected with imperialism, the landlords and the bourgeoisie. In the fall of 1931 the navy mutinied, due to economic causes and without any definite political aim, but was supported by the working masses, under the leadership of the C.P., and played a tremendous rôle in the further development of the revolutionary movement. The mutiny was put down by armed force not so much owing to serious military mistakes of the rebellious navy as because of the weakness of the revolutionary movement in the country (which was responsible also for a number of military weaknesses of the uprising). Finally, the events just described in which the rôle of the C.P. was incomparably larger than in the overthrow of Ibanez or in the mutiny of the navy.

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The sharp and aggravating economic crisis, the disastrous deterioration of the situation of the toiling masses, including the proletariat, the poor and middle peasants, and the lower sections of the petty bourgeoisie of the city, the exploitation of the nationally oppressed Indian masses, and the growing political class consciousness of the proletariat and the strengthening of its rôle in the entire revolutionary movement, finally, the considerable extension of the influence of the C.P. and of the revolutionary unions, serve as a guarantee that the new Davila Government (or the Government of any other representative of the ruling classes) will no longer succeed in crushing the revolutionary movement as easily as Ibanez did in 1926.

Chile is faced with new class battles. Their development and outcome will be mainly dependent upon the force and influence of the C.P., upon its ability to mobilise the masses, to lead their spontaneous struggle, to lead them from partial daily battles to general political battles, upon the ability of the C.P. to correctly estimate the situation and ably utilise it for tactical purposes. The latest events, poor as our information of the rôle of the C.P. may be, have shown that the C.P. of Chile has grown during the last year not only organisationally, but also politically, and extended its influence over the masses. But the same events have also shown that this influence of the C.P. is still undoubtedly insufficient to enable the C.P. of Chile to control the events and play a decisive part in them immediately, that the power of the reformist and socialist influences over the working class of Chile is still very considerable.

The C.P. of Chile is faced with the task of conducting an energetic fight for its legality, for the strengthening of its connections with the working masses, for the extension of its political influence not only over the proletariat but also over the non-proletarian toiling masses of the city and village. The C.P. of Chile must organise and lead the struggle of the masses against Davila's "socialist" Government as a Government of the bourgeois-landlord and imperialist reaction, steadfastly and patiently fighting against all illusions of the different sections of the working class towards it, if such illusions still exist.

The experience of the "socialist" Government of Davila and Grove must be utilised by the C.P. of Chile in order to demonstrate to the masses more clearly the path of the truly revolutionary struggle for the solution of the crisis and the creation of a Worker-Peasant Soviet Government.

SOCIAL-FASCISM IN JAPAN

By AKI

THE Social-Democracy of Japan which constituted itself into a party only recently (in 1924-25), already represents an organisation which has become an integral part of the monarchist régime, and steadily pursues the policy of the ruling bloc of the bourgeoisie and landlords among the masses of the people. The Japanese Social-Democracy utilises the entire experience of the Western-European Social-Democracy in the matter of treachery, in accordance with the economic and political conditions existing in Japan. In certain respects, however, the Japanese Social-Democracy is even preceding the West-European parties. While the Western Social-Democracy issues pacifist declarations *concealing* the actual preparation and danger of imperialist (and, particularly, anti-Soviet) war; the Japanese Social-Democracy either openly or secretly supports the anti-Soviet plunder of war which the ruling bloc of Japan is already waging. While the German Social-Democracy defends the Government of the bourgeois republic exercising a Fascist dictatorship, the Japanese Social-Democracy resorts to every sort of social demagogy to defend the military-police monarchy.

In Japan there are two Social-Fascist parties: the right Social-Democratic Party (Shakai-Minshu-to), and the "left" Social-Democratic Party (Rono Taishu-to) and also the organisation of professional agents-provocateurs, known as "the labour group of the Communist Party of Japan."

The Party of "State Social-Fascists" (who recently split away from the right Social-Democratic Party) openly proclaim their solidarity with the programme and actions of the monarchist military circles, for they express the sentiments of the exploiting sections of the petty bourgeoisie (traders, rich handicraftsmen, Government officials, small industrialists, rich farmers, small and middle landlords, etc.).

Shimanama, the leader of the "State capitalists," said:

> ". . . Everybody must join in a united front with three slogans:
>
> "A People's Party,
>
> "An anti-capitalist Party,
>
> "Not merely a Parliamentary Party.
>
> "This united front should be joined not only by us, the middle class, but also by the great masses of the people: Scientists, Government officials, the military, the clerks, small and middle landlords, small traders and industrialists, city workers and peasants." (Shakai Undo Tsushin, January 14, 1932.)

To-day the Japanese Fascists make it their object to utilise the growing discontent of the petty bourgeoisie of the city and village, and of the backward workers, for the purpose of mobilising them for the war of plunder, and utilising this discontent to strengthen the unbridled reaction. The military-pacifist monarchy, by playing upon the existing chauvinist sentiments of the exploiting section of the petty bourgeoisie, is seeking to strengthen chauvinism among the toilers.

The Japanese Social-Democracy, not excluding its "left" wing, represents the midwife, or to be more exact, the mother of Japanese fascism. The Akamatsu group came from the Shakai Minshu-to and partly the Roni Taishu-to (Shorengo and a section of the Dsenkoku Domei, the Mochizuki-Aki group), while the Oda-Iishi group represents an offshoot of the most "radical" reformist trade union centre Shohio-Gikai.

The Central Committee of the Shakai Minshu-to carried out a "left" manœuvre this year after splitting wih the "State Socialists" (Fascists), issuing the following demagogic slogans:

1. Down with capitalism, for the resolute introduction of Socialism;
2. Onward to the creation of a strong Mushanseito (a party of the propertyless);
3. Down with Fascism;
4. Down with Parliament which neglects the needs of the people.

At the same time the Central Committee of Shakai-Minshu-to fully and unreservedly supports the imperialist policy of the Japanese monarchy as is shown by the following, fifth slogan:

5. The resources of Manchuria for Socialist emancipation.

At the same time the right Social-Democratic Party vigorously flirts with the so-called "State Socialists," especially in view of the fact that the masses organised by it consist mainly of workers of the Government armament plants, and the naval transport (the active members of this organisation consist almost exclusively of the labour aristocracy, foremen and bo'suns).

The "left" Social-Democracy masks its blacklegging and direct co-operation with the police by even more demagogic "revolutionary" phrases and vague declarations.

The mercenary professional agents-provocateurs of the "Labour Group of the Communist Party of Japan" are not merely a group of renegades of Communism, but a body connected with the secret police, conducting provocative

activities among the revolutionary workers under the direct orders of the monarchist police. For this purpose they even "support" such slogans as "For the dictatorship of the proletariat," "Long live the Comintern," etc. If we contrast their betrayal of Party affairs and individual Communists to the police and their numerous declarations of allegiance to the Emperor and the Japanese State to this, it becomes clear that all these slogans merely serve the purpose of creating a misleading conception of the Communist Party of Japan and the Comintern among the revolutionary workers, of discrediting them in the eyes of the masses, and penetrating the revolutionary ranks to facilitate the execution of police orders.

Thus, the Social-Democrats of all shades in Japan use different methods of treachery and deceit, but have one and the same aim: to strengthen the power of the exploiters, to advocate a war policy among the masses, to co-operate with the police in the suppression of the revolutionary movement. This identity of aim of the right and left Social-Democracy explains their recently introduced unification on the basis of a right S.D. platform.

I.—WAR AND THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY.

The Japanese Social-Imperialists and Fascists of all shades speedily reacted to the war of despoliation and the anti-Soviet provocations. In this field they have not only "caught" up with but overtaken and surpassed their Western colleagues (traitors of 1914-18) by giving full support to the ruling classes in the pursuit of the robber war, anti-Soviet provocations and suppression of the revolutionary movement. They supported the programme of action of the militarists, this most reactionary wing of the monarchy, without the slightest hesitation.

There is absolutely no difference between the militarists' slogan of "creating paradise in Manchuria and therefore also in Japan," and the Social-Democratic slogan of "defending Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria to build a Socialist Japan." Essentially these slogans differ in no way from the slogan of the "left" Social-Democratic Party: "Rights and interests in Manchuria must be preserved." The distinction is only one of words and the method of deceiving the masses. True, the "left" Social-Democracy, at the same time, expresses itself timidly "against imperialist war" in general (while misrepresenting the war in Manchuria and China as a non-imperialist war, a national war in defence of the rights and interests of Japan in China.—A.).

This is nothing but a manœuvre, designed to avoid self-exposure to the masses of the workers organised by them, now becoming revolutionary.

Even before the occupation of Manchuria, when feverish preparations were being made for a war of plunder, the Social-Democracy was well aware of them, but carefully concealed them from the masses. With the beginning of hostilities in Manchuria they appeared as rabid supporters of the utmost extension of the plundering war and anti-Soviet provocations. This change cannot be regarded as unexpected. It was a result of the entire previous policy of the Social-Democracy as a whole. The utmost unanimity of Japanese Social-Democracy and the Fascists of all shades in this was revealed.

The organ of the Fascists, led by Akamatsu, "Japanese Socialism," in an editorial in the November issue of 1931, wrote as follows:

> "The Japanese people, if the amount of land and mineral resources are compared with the population, represent the poorest people. The Japanese nation, in short, is the poorest proletariat on an international scale. Modern internationalism says that aggressiveness towards each other is wrong. But why must the Japanese people alone or the few other weak nations who are in a similar position, suffer this, live in congestion on a small plot of land with a relatively huge population and be content with very miserable natural resources.
>
> "We are opposed to such internationalism because it takes as its point of departure the existing State of affairs. To speak on the basis of the existing situation, in other words, not to be aggressive and demand an extension of territory is the same as to say: 'Poor people, be content with being poor.' "

The President of the Japanese Seamen's Union (organised in the Reformist Transport Workers' International), Hamada, who is also a member of the Social-Democratic Party Shakai-Minshu-to, wrote in the organ of this Union in January, 1932, as follows:

> "Were Japan to renounce its interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, it would signify the strengthening of exploitation on the part of the local military cliques, and would also facilitate the annexationist advance of Britain, America and Russia in the Far East. The fact that our country which occupies a small territory, and which is poor in natural wealth and suffers in addition from overpopulation, conducts an economic offensive on Manchuria and Mongolia, which have vast territories, with small populations and are rich in natural resources, the fact that our country intends to exploit these untapped resources by mutual co-

operation between Japan and China, will tremendously benefit not only our country but the Chinese people as well. If we take a Socialist point of view, our country, which has a population of 100 million on an insignificant piece of land, and which is forced to contract itself to the utmost extent, cannot but be called the international proletarian State. In contrast to this China, which possesses a vast territory with a comparatively sparse population, represents an international bourgeois State. At the present time, when it is recognised to be a social right of the proletariat, threatened with the danger of death from starvation, to demand protection of its vital interests against the bourgeoisie which possesses surpluses, the fact that our country, which is an international proletarian State, seeks from China, the bourgeois State, the right to exploit the economic resources, is by no means an imperialist conquest."

The Central Committee of Shakai Minshu-to adopted a special resolution on the report of the delegation sent to Manchuria, stating in part:

"From the point of view of the Communist Party or the pseudo-Communists (referring to the "left" Social-Democrats.—A.) who belong to the left wing of the social movement, it is a sheer departure . . . . They base themselves upon the Communist, schematic view that Japan is an imperialist State, while China is an oppressed nation . . . . The view of the liberal pacifists consists of an atempt to find a compromise decision. Though their motives are pacifist they are entirely unsuited to the solution of this practical question.

"We are convinced of the necessity of building a Socialist Japan, leading her to international Socialism to secure the right of the masses of Japan to live, we consider it unjust that the treaty rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria should be violated."

The leader and official delegate of the Rono Taishu-to, Matzudani, who was sent to Manchuria to study the situation on the spot, presented a report to the Central Committee upon returning, writing in part:

". . . If we assume that the rights and interests in Manchuria had been lost by us, then as a result the capitalists would have gone bankrupt, and the Japanese workers would die of starvation. . .

". . .The present occupation by our country cannot be regarded as an imperialist war . . . Protection against an unlawful violation is really just. We even regret that the occupation has been belated."

From all these statements it is clear that the Japanese Social-Imperialists have gone much further even than the bourgeois liberals. They did not display the least hesitation on the question of the war of plunder and anti-Soviet provocation. Moreover, to carry the workers and toilers with them (among whom the war is not popular and who, despite the war, continue to fight against the capitalists, landlords and police) and divert them from the revolutionary path, they have invented a whole number of "theories" to justify the war, namely: without this war it will be impossible to create a Socialist Japan; the only way for the workers and toilers to avoid death by starvation is to occupy Manchuria and then to start an anti-Soviet robber war. To this end they urge the masses to support the *war plans of the military-feudal monarchy, and its most reactionary wing, the militarists allegedly against the Chinese militarists and the greedy Japanese capitalists.*

The necessity of covering up the most flagrant imperialist policy by Socialist phrases, will be easily understood if we take into consideration not only the constant intensification of the class struggle within the country (the growth of the number of labour and peasant conflicts during the war compared with last year, the unprecedented repression and the struggle against it under the conditions of martial law, etc.), but also the growing discontent and revolutionary fermentation among the Social-Democratic membership masses. We shall attempt to cite a few examples to show how difficult it is for the Social-Democratic leaders to cover up the real nature of the present events.

On November 12, 1931, at a conference of the Executive Committee of the Osaka organisation of the Shakai Minshu-to, the Manchuria question was discussed. The newspaper "Shakai Undo Tsushin" reports the conference in the following terms:

"The Manchurian question has attracted the attention of every country and it was therefore decided to discuss it at the Central Committee, upon the receipt of the report of the delegation to Manchuria, which will return on November 18. At the recent meeting on this question three views were expressed:

"(a). For the war. The motives are that after the defeat of the Party in the municipal election campaign, our agitation against the war, contrary to the sentiments of the people, will lead to very unfavourable prospects for our party (the group of Ogata, the representative of the petty bourgeois sections).

"(b). Against the war. The explanation

given being that from a class point of view we are opposed to a war which defends the bourgeois interests, no matter what the pretext may be (the Umedo group representing factory delegates).

"(c). For the war, but with a reservation. Some of the people attending the meeting favoured the war as a prerequisite to democratic Socialism, without granting the monopoly right to the exploitation of the territory after the war to a section of the bourgeoisie (the group led by the member of Parliament, Nishio, consisting of the party leaders)."

These views reflected the sentiments of the different sections of the population and the adroit tactics of the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party. The first view reflects the sentiments of the exploiting sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the second, despite the fact that its spokesmen are leaders of the right Social-Democracy among the workers, still reflects the anti-war sentiment or, at least, the lack of popularity of the war among the workers who are even members of the Social-Democracy; the third reveals to us the meanest tactics of the leaders who call upon the working masses to give their active support to the robber war allegedly in the interests of Socialism.

The congress of the right Social-Democracy, attended also by the Fascists of the Akamatsu group, adopted the slogan: "Protect the rights and interests of Manchuria." They are now carrying on a frantic campaign in favour of the war in the factories. They organise patriotic demonstrations under the slogan: "Against currency speculations and for using the profits from speculation for the war and the soldiers at the front." They are conducting a great campaign to collect donations for the war and the soldiers under different patriotic slogans. For instance, a correspondent of the Reformist Seamen's Union writes:

"In response to a call of the Secretary of the upper deck group we shouted hurrah three times: for the Emperor, for the Navy, and the Army, who are defending the residence, the people's rights and interests in freezing Manchuria."

They have organised talks in the presence of the Chairman of the Union on the question of Japan's surplus population and of Manchuria. They have organised, especially after the occupation of Shanghai, "stormy" demonstrations of unemployed seamen under the slogan: "Out with Chinese seamen from Japanese ships." The leaders of the Union, who only recently have agreed to a 7 per cent. wage cut for all the seamen, without a fight, and who explained the causes of unemployment as an inevitable evil, this time displayed "full readiness and determination."

Similar pictures describing the entire meanness of the social-traitors may be observed everywhere.

The "left" Social-Democracy could not take up an openly chauvinist attitude towards the war at once. While fully supporting the plundering war and the anti-Soviet provocation, it was compelled to manœuvre before the mass of the membership becoming revolutionary. On the one hand, it sent its delegate, Matzudani, to Manchuria, and through his mouth propagated the necessity of active support of the robber war, and on the other, appointed the so-called "anti-war committee" (while sabotaging and combatting by all means the active anti-war struggle of its members), to deceive the revolutionising mass of members.

The position of Rono Taishu-to is described by the leader of this Party, Matzudani, in his statement at the beginning of December as follows:

"I have recently heard that the Party has altered its former resolution to the effect that Japan's rights and interests in Manchuria must not be renounced and must be protected, but opposing the present military occupation as constituting an imperialist war . . .

"But to defend the rights and interests in Manchuria, and oppose in essence the protection of these interests is a very strange theory and a bad deceit . . .

"I boldly advise to put an end to this deceit."

In actual fact, after the formation of the anti-war committee at the tenth meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Rono Taishu-to, on September 29, and until the fifteenth meeting of the Presidium (November 4) the theses on the struggle against the occupation were discussed only once, and on November 13, at the regular meeting of the Secretariat, *a resolution was adopted to the effect that the Manchurian question must be excluded* from those questions, concerning the struggle against imperialist war.

(To be continued.)

THE FOURTH OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE CHINESE RED ARMY

(A military review based upon the materials published in the bourgeois press.)

By ASSOV.

THE development of the revolutionary Soviet movement in China, the extension and consolidation of the Soviet regions, the growth of the Chinese Red Army, and the strengthening of its fighting power, could not but alarm the Kuomintang and imperialist camp.

During the last few years the Kuomintang has organised three big offensives against the Reds. All these three offensives, despite the enormous numerical and technical superiority of the Kuomintang armies compared with the Red Army, and despite their superiority also in regard to ammunition, ended in complete failure. The Red Army not only repulsed these attacks, but inflicted numerous defeats upon the reactionary forces, crushed and disarmed about 15 enemy divisions, captured over 100 generals and colonels, about 80,000 soldiers, over 100,000 rifles, some 500 machine-guns, over 50 field-guns, three-four airplanes, an enormous amount of ammunition and other war trophies, and emerged from this struggle stronger and more numerous than ever.

At the beginning of 1932 the Red Army had about 150,000 combatants. It also has as a reserve Red and Young Guards numbering a total of 100,000 men. The Red and Young Guards are a militia formation who receive military training, and carry out guard duties in their districts, without leaving their regular employment. In many cases detachments of the Red and Young Guards, acting on orders of the Red Army command, have fought hand in hand with the Red Army in the battles against the militarist forces.

At the beginning of 1932 the Chinese Red Army, according to the Japanese press, consisted of the following formations.

Name of highest formation:

First Army of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung.
Second Army of Ho Lung.
Third Army of Pen Teh-hwai.
Fourth Army of Kwan Tsi-hsiun.

Individual units:

IX. corps.
X. corps.
XVI. corps.
First, second and third separate divisions.

At the end of 1931, the Red Army held the following regions: the First and Third Armies occupied the South-Eastern section of Kiangsi and the Western part of Fukien; the First, Second and Third separate divisions operated in the Western part of Kiangsi and, in the South-Eastern belt of Hunan (in the district of Chalin, Lianhua), the XVI. corps operated at the junction of the Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh provinces (in the district of Inin, Tungshan and Tungchen).

The Second Army operated in the lake district of Central Hupeh and Northern Hunan.

The IX. corps operated in North-Western Hupeh.

The Fourth Army held the district which forms the border between the provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei.

The X. corps was active in the North-Eastern part of Kiangsi, and at the junction of the provinces of Anhwei, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Fukien.

Upon repulsing Chang Kai-shek's third offensive the Red Armies quickly restored the position existing before the offensive and forced the reactionary troops to take up the defensive. According to the accounts of the Far-Eastern bourgeois press, at the beginning of December, the Red Army command worked out a plan of further advance. The main task of the operations of the Red Army was to merge the isolated Soviet regions into two great territories, the first to the South of the Yangtse, and the second on the Northern bank of the Yangtse.

In the latter half of January the Red Armies apparently proceeded to fulfil this plan.

The forces and grouping of the reactionary armies, according to the Chinese press, appeared at that time as follows:

The First and Third Red Armies were confronted in the North with ten infantry and one cavalry divisions and three separate brigades, totalling 120,000 men, and in the West, in the region of Kanchow, with one infantry brigade numbering 3,000 men.

In the South, along the Kwantung-Kiangsi border, there was one infantry division and three infantry brigades aggregating 25,000 men, and finally, in the East, in the Province of Fukien, there were two infantry divisions and one infantry brigade, totalling about 30,000 men.

The XVI. corps was opposed in the North and North-West by four divisions totalling 45,000 men, and in the South and South-East by about three divisions with 25,000 men.

The Second Army was opposed in the North by one division (10,000 men), in the West by one division and one brigade totalling 13,000 men, in the South by one division of 10,000 men and in the East by two divisions and one brigade aggregating about 25,000 men. The Fourth Red Army was faced in the North with three infantry and one cavalry divisions aggregating 40,000

men, in the East by two infantry divisions numbering 20,000 men, in the South by three divisions totalling 30,000 men, and in the West by three divisions, also totalling about 30,000 men.

THE FIGHTING IN THE CENTRAL SOVIET REGION.

In the middle of January the VII. and XXII. corps of the Third Red Army numbering some 20,000 men advanced from the Yuitu and Hsinkwo regions in the direction of Kanchow. Without much difficulty they succeeded by the end of the month in capturing Shan-yui, Nankan, Kiangkow and surrounding Kanchow. The capture of the city represented a complicated and difficult task owing to the severe shortage of ammunition and the difficult approaches to the town. The weakness of the work of demoralising the enemy, the almost complete absence of party-political work within the city further complicated the task of capturing the town. All this taken together, coupled with the determined resistance offered by the Kuomintang forces, which were well supplied with ammunition, resulted in the siege of the town developing into a protracted affair.

The advance of the First Army units upon Kwanchang and Nanfeng met with speedy success. The Reds succeeded in cutting off the XXIX. and XXVII. divisions of Sun Liang-chun from the main group of the Kuomintang forces and inflicting serious blows upon them. Sun's divisions, which had been badly thrashed by the Reds previously during the third expedition, and which were demoralised as a result of their long contact with the Red Army, failed to withstand the blows of the First Army and began to surrender in complete regiments, nine regiments joining the Reds almost in a body out of a total of twelve. The other regiments, and a few detachments from those regiments which surrendered to the Reds succeeded in breaking through to the North.

The activisation of the Red Armies, the extension of the Soviet regions in Kiangsi as well as in Hupeh, Hunan, and Anhwei, the threat to merge the scattered Soviet districts into a vast unbroken Soviet territory, and the fear of their fate, prompted the Kuomintang "patriots," at the time of the most strenuous fight of the XIX. Army against the Japanese invasion of Shanghai, to adopt a decision to start a new advance against the Reds.

The invasion of the Kwantung borders by units of the Third Red Army, the fear that the Soviet movement might extend to Kwantung, and the desire to demonstrate his ability to defeat the Red Armies to the imperialists and thus to appear on the national arena with their aid, and finally the anxiety to secure funds and ammunition for his army, prompted Chen Tsi-tang, the head of the Canton Government, to join in the new offensive against the Reds.

At numerous conferences of the Nanking and Canton generals the Kuomintang representatives attempted to work out a uniform plan of action against the Red Armies and create a joint operative centre. The creation of a single operative centre, as might have been expected, proved to be an insurmountable task for Nanking and Canton which, while ostensibly at peace, actually continued to be hostile to each other. Moreover, a single operative centre could not be created even among the Nanking forces engaged against the Reds. Unity of action was attempted to be established by means of "co-ordination" of the plans of the different independent generals.

As before, the main attention and the principal forces were directed against the First and Third Red Armies. At conferences between representatives of Chen Tsi-tang and the commissioner for the "pacification" of Kiangsi the following plan of operations to wipe out the Reds was adopted. The Canton forces were to advance in two shock groups: the first consisting of three divisions and two individual brigades and equipped with 20 airplanes was to advance in two columns from the districts of Shiuchow and Nanhsiun, the right column into Tinan, Anyuan, Hweichan, Shuikin and the left into Shaochow, Kanchow, Yuitu, Nintu. At the same time three divisions of Nanking troops were to be sent from the district to Taiho into Kanchow whence they were to advance in the direction of Hsinkwo-Nantu.

The second shock group of the Canton forces, consisting of three divisions and one infantry brigade with seven airplanes, together with a division of Fukien troops, was to be concentrated in the region of Yunting, Shanhan, whence it was to advance in the direction of Tingchow, Nintu, and Wuping, Hweichang, Nintu.

In the district of Nintu the operation of destroying the First and Third Red Armies was to have been completed.

The actual progress of the fighting, according to accounts published in the Chinese, English and Japanese bourgeois press, appears to have been as follows:

At the end of February the XVIII. corps of the Nanking Army arrived from the district of Taiho in the district of Kanchow and entered the city early in March.

The relationship of the forces fighting for Kanchow then sharply changed in favour of the Kuomintang. Against the VII. and XXII. corps of the Third Army were concentrated three divi-

sions and one brigade aggregating about 35,000 men. At the beginning of March the vanguard of the First Canton corps entered Kiangsi further changing the relationship of forces in favour of the Kuomintang armies.

Under the pressure of the XVIII. corps, and in view of the threat to certain units of the Red Army, from the rear, on the part of the First Canton Corps, the Third Red Army lifted the siege of Kanchow on March 7 and started a slow retreat in the direction of Yuitu-Hsinko while some of the detachments retreated to Shan-yui-chun. The stubborn resistance offered by the Reds, their invariable support by the toiling population, the clever partisan operations, the lack of confidence of the Kuomintang command in the reliability of their own forces, and fears for their communication lines greatly limited the successes of the whites. In two months of fighting they succeeded in pressing back the units of the Third Army a distance of only 35-50 kilometres to the East of the River Kan. But even these "victories" of the Kuomintang Armies, like the previous ones, proved to be far from lasting. According to the latest information the Third Red Army not only arrested the further advance of the reactionary forces but took up the offensive and has begun to press the whites from the district of Yuitu-Hsinkwo in a South-Western direction.

At the same time the Red forces located in the district of Chun-yi also commenced active operations. At the beginning of May they captured the Meilin Mountain viaduct, thus cutting off the first Canton corps from its base.

The operations of the Third Canton corps during this whole period resulted only in the capture of Shanhan, Wuping and Chaping, Wuping being recaptured in the middle of April by detachments of the First Army. The Third Canton Corps advanced to the North, a total of 20-30 kilometres. This slowness, laxity and indecisiveness of the operations of the enemy was apparently quickly appreciated and splendidly utilised by the Red Army command. Continuing to resist the advance of the Third Canton Corps in small units, the First Army command concentrated a shock group in the Tingchow district consisting of more than two corps and attacked the 49 division of the Fukien forces in Western Lung-yan at the beginning of April. The blow was so swift and sudden that the surprised enemy did not even succeed in organising any sort of resistance, and retreated in panic in an eastern and south-eastern direction, throwing away their arms and ammunition. In the very first battles the First Army completely routed one enemy brigade, and developing its success in the direction of Changchow wiped out the remnants of the enemy division. Advancing 160 kilometres in ten days the First Army units occupied Changchow on the night of April 18.

During this operation the Reds captured about 6,000 rifles, dozens of machine-guns, much ammunition and two airplanes.

Upon capturing Changchow they did not discontinue the pursuit of the enemy forces which were retreating to the south-east and north-east, and occupied the coast for a distance of 100 kilometres. Units of the First Army which were operating to the South of Changchow approached the borders of Kwantung threatening the rear of the Third Canton Corps. Fearing to be weakened (if not completely crushed) in the fighting against the Reds, and in view of the new strife among the militarists, Chen Tsi-tang decided to recall his forces within the boundaries of Kwantung.

Thus, the "formidable" plans to destroy the First and Third Red Armies again disgracefully collapsed like all their predecessors.

On the other fronts of the Red Army the fighting from the beginning of the advance, according to the accounts of the same press, developed as follows.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY.

At the beginning of January the Third Corps of the Second Army, seeking to join the Fourth Army, started an advance from the district of Tsinshan in the direction of Incheng. On January 27, the corps defeated in the district of Inchen one brigade of the fourth division of the enemy, capturing about 2,000 rifles and over a score of light machine-guns. Simultaneously the VI. Corps advancing from the district of Tsin-li to the north-east, captured Hwanlintsi at the end of January in an attempt to join the XVI. Corps then engaged in an advance in the direction of Lutzikow.

Continuing the offensive on Inchen the III. Corps on February 24 routed the Fourth enemy division which was defending the town, capturing it.

The capture of Inchen by the Reds naturally alarmed the Kuomintang Army command as this involved the threat of the Second and Fourth Red Armies joining forces and interrupting the traffic on the Beiping-Hankow railway.

To arrest the further advance of the III. Corps the Kuomintang Army command hastily moved the X. Corps, consisting of three divisions and two separate brigades, to the scene of action. Under the pressure of these forces the III. Corps abandoned Inchen, retreating several kilometres to the south-west.

In the middle of March the Second Army, consisting of the combined forces of the III. and VI. Corps undertook an offensive upon Tienmen. This offensive was successful and the Reds succeeded in inflicting a serious blow at the 48th Army division. Two regiments of this division deserted to the Reds. However, the arrival of enemy reinforcements, particularly of seven bombing planes, interfered with the further progress of the Second Army which was engaged in severe battles with the X. Corps of the whites in the district of Tienmen-Hunhu up to the middle of May.

OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY.

At the beginning of January units of the Fourth Red Army stationed in the district of Shanchen began to advance upon the city. The 58th Division which defended Shanchen was cut off from its main group of forces concentrated in the district of Kwanchow. For more than a month this division waited in the city for reinforcements. As none arrived the 58th Division abandoned the city on February 10 and breaking through the Red siege retreated in a northern direction. On the same day the Fourth Army detachments entered Shanchen.

Pursuing the victory, the Fourth Army on February 27 captured Sanho, moving into the rear of the 58th and 45th enemy divisions. Here again the 58th Division sustained serious losses and the enemy command, fearing that the remnants of the division might join the Reds, sent them back to the rear, replacing them by the 20th Division. The further progress of the Reds in this direction was stopped by the strong reinforcements of the Nanking troops.

In the middle of March the main forces of the Fourth Army, concentrating in the district of Hwan-an, Machen started an advance in the direction of Hwanpeh, Hsiaokan with a view to joining hands with the Second Red Army. Serious engagements developed against the 4th, 69th, 30th and 31st Divisions, and on March 20 some Red units approached the Peiping-Hankow line. But so far the 4th Red Army was unable to break the resistance of the Kuomintang forces in this district.

The operations of the Fourth Red Army in the north-eastern direction, Liuanchow-Teng-yan, during April and the first half of May developed into a great offensive. Besieging Liuanchow at the beginning of April where the 46th enemy division locked itself up, the Fourth Red Army did not stop there, but continued its rapid march along the valley of the Rivers Piho and Hwaiho. Throwing back the 12th and 55th enemy divisions the Fourth Red Army captured the cities of Hakin and Shinchow and advanced further towards Pengnu on the Tientsin-Pukow railway.

As a result of the battles during three months the Fourth Red Army captured over 15,000 rifles, 300 machine-guns, a large quantity of ammunition, one airplane and other trophies, in addition to the divisional commander, several brigade and regimental commanders.

The Fourth Kuomintang punitive expedition may be considered to have ended. Its results are far from splendid to the reactionary forces. From the beginning of the expedition and until the middle of May the First Red Army considerably extended the territories of the Central Soviet Region at the expense of the southern and south-eastern districts of Fukien. The Fourth Red Army also extended its Soviet Region into the Hupeh and Anhwei Provinces. The Reds captured about 25,000 rifles, 500 heavy and light machine-guns, a large quantity of ammunition, three airplanes and many other war trophies, and wiped out five Kuomintang divisions.

These successes of the Chinese Red Armies are not merely partial victories but represent a great political victory of the Chinese Soviet revolution.

Serving as an indication of the growth and consolidation of the Soviet movement, as well as of the impotence of the Kuomingtang reaction in the fight against the Soviets, these successes of the Chinese Red Army create the confidence that the Red Army of China will succeed in repulsing the fifth expedition now under preparation just as effectively and further extend and consolidate the Soviet territories.

PARTY LEADERSHIP OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

THE question of winning the majority of the working-class youth to the side of communism is one of the most important elements in the solution of the strategical problem of winning the majority of the working class to the side of the Communist Parties, and of spreading its influence among the wide masses of the working-class population.

Owing to the crisis on the one hand, and the successful building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. on the other, new and interesting changes are taking place among the youth in the capitalist countries.

The most vital question which each young worker, peasant, office employee, and student, has to face in capitalist countries is the question of his future, the question of to-morrow. In the period of relative stabilisation of capitalism large numbers of young workers were drawn into industry. Now, millions of unemployed, including among them millions of unemployed youth, provide a still further reserve for yet cheaper labour power. Owing to the closing down of works in a number of branches of industry, the shutting down of factories, and the reduction in staff in factories still running, large masses of young workers have no chance of getting into a factory. In Hamburg sixty per cent. of those who left school this year (including those who finished a trade school) failed to obtain employment. Of the remaining forty per cent., the majority are working as messengers or other blind-alley jobs, and not at their trade at all.

In a number of countries the unemployed youth are struck off unemployed pay. There is a continuous cutting of the wages of the young worker as well as his unemployment pay (in those countries where he still receives it). It is a well-known fact that many young persons who leave higher educational establishments cannot find work in the occupation for which they specialised.

The youth in the capitalist countries has *no future, no prospects.* This partly explains why the political parties (including the Social Democratic Party) have met with a certain amount of success in preparing the youth for war. This preparation is carried on by various means—by semi-military organisations, sport organisations, etc. And finally through "compulsory-voluntary" militarised labour (for example, Germany).

At the same time whole sections of the youth are becoming radical and are being drawn into political life. These are young persons who did not participate directly and actively in the imperialist war nor in the revolutions after the war.

These young workers are no longer satisfied with the "cultural, non-political" work offered them until recently by the Social-Democrats. They demand *politics,* they demand from the political parties clear prospects for themselves; they wish to actively participate in the struggle to extricate themselves out of the present situation.

This is understood by the capitalist governments, as well as by all parties. That is why the Communists' fight for the youth has assumed such an acute form. It is sufficient to mention such facts as the famous proposal of Grenner in Germany to prohibit young persons from taking part in politics. The increased terror against the youth movement, the preparations for the suppression of the Young Communist League of Germany, the suppression of the Young Communist League in Czecho-Slovakia and Austria, such facts that the fascists of Germany, in their demands, methods of work and agitation, to a great extent adapt themselves to the youth, and have already secured a large percentage of youth in their shock detachments, and finally the fact that the Social Democratic Party is paying greater attention than before to the Young Socialist League (question pertaining to the youth is raised in all party conferences, the sending of "leaders" to work with the socialist youth, the attention paid by the social fascist press to questions relating to the work), all paints a clear picture of the sharp struggle for the youth that is being waged between ourselves and our enemies, in which the latter have thrown all their forces.

One of the results of this fight is the fact that in this extremely favourable situation for *our work,* not only does the Young Communist International grow, but the social democratic and fascist youth organisations also grow. We communists have not yet managed to find our way to the youth masses, and it is due to that fact that large numbers of the youth, in search of a way out of the crisis, have not yet found their way to us, are not yet convinced that only the revolutionary way will solve all their burning questions, and are seeking their future in the policy of the "lesser evil" advocated by the social-fascists, or in the radical and demagogical promises of the fascists.

The question of the youth is becoming of vast importance in view of the preparation of a new imperialist war and intervention against the U.S.S.R. In a number of countries, especially

in the countries defeated in the imperialist war, a large section of the youth was brought up and was permeated with a nationalist spirit, the spirit of *"revanche."* The teachings of Lenin, of the bolsheviks, the resolutions passed by the Comintern, on the tasks and duty of the proletariat in the war have not reached the youth.* The army will largely consist of the youth.

Young men under military age, women and old men, will be kept for service in the rear.

All this will make it necessary for the Communist Parties to exert a great effort in developing the struggle for the youth, and to draw in all the mass revolutionary organisations and organs (the press, trade unions, sport, and cultural organisations, etc.), into the direct struggle for the youth.

The question of the relations between the Party and the Young Communist League has long been solved in principle by a number of resolutions, by the experienced leadership of the Young Communist League of the Soviet Union, by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the practical leadership of the Young Communist International, by the Comintern.

However, in the practical work of the party organisations, these principles, as well as the concrete instructions given by the Comintern have been very inadequately and in some cases very unsatisfactorily applied.

> "Considering that the Communist Parties bear political responsibility for the state of the Young Communist Leagues, because only with the energetic support and leadership of the Party can the weaknesses be overcome and the Young Communist Leagues successfully developed, the Plenum imposed the duty upon the Communist Parties of reorganising their activity in the sphere of work among the youth" (directives of the E.C.C.I. explaining the decisions of the Eleventh Plenum regarding the improvement of Party leadership of the Y.C.L.).

The Communist Parties have *not carried out* this decision. Not a single Party has really made any serious attempts to reorganise its work among the youth. It may be said that apart from the Communist Party of Germany, which after the Eleventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. energetically took up the question of the Young Communist League (and later cooled off considerably), and partly also the Polish and Chinese Parties, the Young Communist League seems to have dropped out of the field of vision of the Communist Parties in their practical work, and that in calculating the class forces and opportunities for struggle, the Young Communist League is not taken into account to the extent that it should be. The reason for this, of course, is that the Y.C.L.s are weak and that their contacts with the masses of the young workers are poor. But this is precisely why the Parties should pay more attention than ever to the Y.C.L. and provide it with *day to day* leadership and assistance. By its decision that the Y.C.L. should be broader organisations than the Party from the point of view of numbers, the Eleventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. gave the line to the Y.C.L.s to develop the widest possible mass work and consolidate the political successes that have been achieved organisationally. This was also an instruction to the Parties, who should so reorganise the work of the Y.C.L.s that they shall really become mass organisations and one of the principal transmission belts from the Party to the working class.

This, which would appear to be perfectly clear, was not understood, and has not been carried out either by the Communist Parties or by the Y.C.L.s. The leadership of the German Y.C.L. (supported by certain members in the party leadership), tried to reduce the whole thing to figures, to declare that the task is impossible, etc. (subsequently these comrades abandoned this point of view). They fail to understand that this was not a matter of figures, but that it was a *policy* to be taken in the work among the masses, and calling for a corresponding reorganisation of the *whole* of the activities of the Y.C.L. Certain comrades in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia declared this decision to be . . . . vanguardist.* Similar opinions were expressed in the Swedish and Austrian Communist Parties.

The following table shows to what extent the decisions to the effect that a Y.C.L. group should be formed in every enterprise where there is a Party group is being carried out :—

Countries.	Members Organised in Factory Groups.	Y.C.L. Groups.
Germany	1938 (Dec., 1931)	538 (May, 1932)
France	450 (Mar., 1932)	45 (Mar., 1932)
Czecho-Slovakia	447 (Feb., 1932)	106 (May, 1932)
Great Britain	49 (Nov., 1931)	8 (1932)
U.S.A.	77 (1931)	10 (1932)

It is quite obvious that there is a discrepancy between the work of the Communist Parties and of the Y.C.L.s, particularly in regard to work in the factories. And yet, both the Parties and the Y.C.L.s should concentrate their attention on winning the factories to their influence. How else can this discrepancy be explained except by the fact that the Parties devote too little attention *to taking a practical part* in the work of the Y.C.L. In a long, windy resolution passed by

*See "The Attitude of the Proletariat to War." 6d. Modern Books Ltd.

*The theory that the Youth are the "advance guard" of the whole movement.—Ed.

the Congress of the Norwegian Party, not a word is said in appraisement of the Party's work among the youth, and instead of investigating the *reason why* the *Norwegian* Young Communist League has not overcome its lag, why the Party in *Norway* devotes little attention to the work of the Y.C.L., and laying down a broad line of work for the Y.C.L., the resolution schematically repeats general postulates, copies general formulae, which in some cases are wrong.

One can go on citing a number of facts of a like nature to show that the Party press pays very little attention to the questions of the youth, that in Germany the last International Youth Day (Easter, 1932), in spite of the fact that it was carried out this year under exceptionally difficult conditions, in fact received no support from the party organisations (some local organisations even opposed it, and advanced obviously opportunist and legalist motives, *viz.*, that the government has declared "civil peace"* for the Easter holidays, and the celebrations might give cause for suppressing the Y.C.L.).

It is particularly important to emphasise the weakness of the ideological work that the party carries on in the Y.C.L. It is a well-known fact that the decisions of the C.C. of the German Communist Party regarding individual terror, the referendum against the Prussian government, and the tactics of the united front from below, met with opposition among groups of members of the Y.C.L. It is likewise well known that on the questions of the struggle against war, and the danger of intervention against the U.S.S.R. there was (and still is) a lack of understanding among the members of the Y.C.L. However, all these facts failed to make the party organisations more alert to the process going on among the youth, these facts did not call forth the practical aid of the *whole* of the party organisations to overcome these things. This was particularly clearly proved in the last Lenin-Liebknecht-Luxembourg Day campaign. The E.C. of the Young Communist International gave the directives—that this campaign be closely connected with a wide popularisation of the questions raised in Comrade Stalin's letter in the "Proletarskaya Revolyutsia."† This directive in most cases was not carried out. This shows that a number of the Leagues did not grasp the great bolshevising importance of Comrade Stalin's letter for the youth movement, to imbue the masses of the youth with the theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, to transfer the bolshevik experience to the Young Communist League.

From all these facts we must draw the following deductions and make the following proposals on Party leadership. The carrying out of the line of principle in the field of Party work, the carrying out of the directives of the E.C.C.I. must not be confined to or narrowed down to the connection or leadership of this or that Party organisation with the Y.C.L. organisation. It is a question of winning the youthful masses to the side of Communism. Consequently, the Parties must bring all their forces, all their auxiliary organisations, all their lower units into play to solve this problem. This is a question of *daily* leadership. There are still in the Y.C.L.s vanguardist tendencies, tendencies towards "independence," to demand "equal rights" with the Party on youth questions. These tendencies must be thoroughly exposed by the ideological and practical leadership of the Party.

It is necessary that each Party, when carrying out any measure, shall introduce where it is possible, special questions touching the youth, and then mobilise the Y.C.L. to carry out all these measures.

It is necessary to take immediate steps to create a strong Party core in the Y.C.L., particularly among the active members of the Y.C.L.

The tradition still exists that when a member of the Y.C.L. enters the Party, he must go on Party work. This is due to the failure to understand that work in the Y.C.L. is important Party work. An investigation of the active membership in certain selected districts revealed that 4 per cent. were Party members. On the other hand, in the Parties there are many young members who are not taking any part in the work of winning the youth masses to our side.

In addition to sending groups of comrades to strengthen the Party leadership (and thus strengthening the Y.C.L. organisations), it is necessary at the same time to see to it that the best members of the Y.C.L. join the Party while remaining in the Y.C.L. in order to act as the conduits of Party influence on it.

All this demands that each Party organisation should know the processes going on among the youth and the Y.C.L. and that it give the lead on all essential questions, daily lead the practical work of the Y.C.L. and organise the work of all the Party members, for carrying out the decisions of the E.C.C.I. on this question.

There are many defects in the work of the Y.C.L., many mistakes are committed. The lag that was pointed out by the Eleventh Plenum of the E.C.C.I. has not yet been overcome by a long way. All efforts must be concentrated upon completely overcoming this lag under the leadership of the Party.

A. FRUMKIN.

*"Burgfrieden."—Ed.

†See No. 20, Vol. 8 (1931) Communist International.

"PARTEIARBEITER," No. 6, JUNE, 1932, ORGAN OF THE ORGANISATION DEPARTMENT OF THE C.C. OF THE C.P. OF GERMANY

By O. Bewer.

The June issue of "Parteiarbeiter" (the Party Worker) does not correspond in the least to the tasks at present confronting the C.P. of Germany. The C.C. of the C.P. of Germany justly demands from the entire Party that it concentrate in the immediate future upon the organisational consolidation of the Party. The whole situation in Germany peremptorily dictates to the Party, to all the Party organisations, a radical re-organisation of the forms and methods of Party work. *the real shifting of the centre of the entire Party work into the factories, a speedy and serious preparation in all the links of the Party organisation, for a struggle against the prohibition of the Party, and the mass organisations standing close to the Party.* None of these most important tasks found any reflection in the June issue of the "Party Worker." The editorial article in the June issue is devoted to the "struggle against wage cuts, fascism and the war danger."

The caption correctly enumerates the central problems raised by the last Plenum of the C.C., but the editorial, instead of concretely detailing these questions, confines itself to repeating the resolution of the C.C. Plenum—in other words. At the very end the editorial notes that, despite the tremendous aggravation of the situation in the country, the work of the factory groups and revolutionary trade union organisations in the factories of military importance has lately weakened. Noting this entirely unpardonable situation, the article limits itself to a call to expose and prevent the development of the war industry, a call to proceed from words to action, but says nothing about *how* this is to be done, though the gist of the question lies precisely here, precisely in explaining this question which the editorial ignores; this is one of the central and most important tasks of the "Party Worker," the organ of the organisational department of the C.C. and of the Party as a whole. Indeed, the C.P. of Germany has more than once raised the question of the necessity of proceeding from talk to action in the fight against the danger of imperialist war, recognising that the best way to develop an effective struggle against the danger of imperialist war, consists in strengthening the factory nuclei in the big enterprises of the key industries and transport; on this question there are not one or two but boxfuls of good resolutions and circulars, yet in the end, as the editorial of the June issue of the "Party Worker" states, precisely during the last weeks when the question of an effective mass revolutionary struggle against imperialist war appeared with special force, this struggle has been weakened. Hence, the central Party question at present consists, not in repeating for the 1,000th time that the Party work in big factories must be strengthened, but of showing and explaining *how* this must be done, how the Party work must be changed in practice, so that this strengthening of the Party work in the big factories shall finally commence. The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P. of Germany decided to resolutely put an end to this state of affairs, wherein the most important resolutions regarding strengthening the work in the biggest factories, remain on paper. The Plenum decided to secure this change by strengthening the organisational department of the C.C. and changing the methods of its work.

The editorial of the June number of the "Party Worker" does not reflect this change at all. As regards the other articles of the June issue, things are even worse, as not one of them even raises the tasks mentioned in the editorial. It is sufficient to enumerate the titles of these articles : "Strengthen the Work on the Front of the Struggle of the Unemployed," "The Importance of Correct Statistics of Party Registration," "Remarks on Party Work in Big Factories with Village Workers"; this is followed by the department. "From Practice for Practice," containing the following materials : "The Struggle against a Reduction of the Working Hours among the Post and Telegraph Workers," "Experience of a Strike," "Data on the Composition of the Working Population of Auerburg," and several similar notes which have only an indirect relation to the present central questions of Party structure in the C.P. of Germany.

What material should the June issue of the "Party Worker" have contained? On the basis of the decision of the C.C. to concentrate the attention and forces of the Party upon the most important centres, and upon the decisive enterprises in these industrial centres, it was necessary to show how, on these most important sections of the class struggle of the proletariat, *the directions of the C.C. in shifting the centre of gravity of the Party work to the factories, with a view to developing the united proletarian front for*

the struggle against imperialist war and fascism, are being fulfilled. The same should be done in the subsequent issues of the magazine. From number to number it is necessary to check up, step by step, the actual operation of the C.C. directions, calling for a change in the forms and methods of Party work on the most important sections of the class struggle, to show and explain the mistakes committed, to give the clearest possible and most concrete indications of how these mistakes should be corrected.

The basic causes of the weakening of the Party work in the factories of military importance in the recent period should be sought in the insufficient attention to these most important questions on the part of the respective organs of the Party leadership. This is clear for the following reasons. The Party knew that it was imperatively necessary for it to strengthen the work in the factories of military importance. The Party should have foreseen that the ruling classes would resort to all means in order to weaken the work of the Party in these factories and even liquidate it altogether. Being aware of all this, the Party should have taken the necessary conspirative measures and *strengthened* the mass work, to paralyse the attacks of the ruling classes. There is least justification of the failure to capture the working masses, particularly in the big industrial centres and important factories, for a strong Party such as the C.P. of Germany, fighting under conditions of a rising revolutionary wave. To accomplish this the Party leadership must conduct a campaign for the capture of these commanding heights of the revolutionary class struggle with the greatest determination and steadfastness. This applies primarily to the district and sub-district Party committees upon which devolves the greatest responsibility at present. The C.C. together with the district committees maps out the districts and factories, and redistributes the Party forces accordingly. The question appears in such a way that it is now necessary to reduce the Party apparatus to the minimum, especially the central Party apparatus, to use all the forces in the factories. The C.C. must secure this as soon as possible, establishing the strictest control over the district committees. The district committees in turn, operating through the Local Party committees must organise a systematic struggle within the shortest possible period for the capture of the most important factories, utilising to this end all the best forces, both local and those sent from the C.C. Here it will be necessary to extensively resort to the creation of special brigades, to make the widest use of the fractions in the trade unions and in the different mass proletarian organisations, in the shop committees, in the united front organs, etc., the main point is, however, *that the district committees must maintain constant contact with the groups in the big factories so that the* district and local committees might know what is going on in these factories, and on the basis of a good acquaintance with the situation there, carry out a regrouping of the forces with the utmost speed and flexibility, a change of the forms and methods of Party work, and the forms and methods of approaching the masses, with a view to their speediest and widest mobilisation, for the revolutionary struggle against the class enemy. In the C.P. of Germany the district and local committees are still unequal to the tasks raised at the moment: they are, as a rule, still without initiative, immobile, loosely connected with the factories (cases are still possible, as was the situation in the Hörsch factory where the local committee did not know that the factory had been closed for a number of days) and *render very little assistance to the factory groups.* Yet, without a radical reconstruction of the work of the district and local Party committees the factory groups will not get on their feet, and without strengthening the factory groups, the Party cannot develop a successful struggle against the fascist offensive and the imperialist war. It is this point, therefore, that the "Party Worker" should be stressing with utmost emphasis from issue to issue.

Another question, connected with the first, consists of the strengthening of *the activity and mass work of the factory groups.* This requires that the factory groups receive constant living and capable assistance (rather than circulars) from the corresponding district and local committees. Such assistance must follow the lines of (1) teaching to master the basic methods of combining legal with semi-legal and illegal methods of work in the factory, publishing and successfully distributing the illegal mass factory newspaper regularly; (2) systematic explanation of the line of the Party and assistance in its concrete application in the given factory; (3) co-ordination of the struggle of the workers of the given factory with the struggle of the other sections of the proletariat; (4) co-ordination of the work of the group with the work of the fractions of the respective trade union organisations, and other mass proletarian organisations.

Here we shall touch upon one of the most important questions of the moment, the work in the reformist trade unions, on which there is no clarity in the ranks of the lower activists of the C.P. of Germany (and not of the lower activists alone). We should like to formulate this question as follows. In the report of one of the lower functionaries of the Red Miners' Union of the

Ruhr, delivered at the end of May, 1932, it was stated that in the Ruhr the revolutionary trade union opposition includes only the unorganised workers, while as regards the members of the reformist trade unions, many of them are dissatisfied with their Social-Fascist leaders and although in some local branches of the reformist Miners' Union of the Ruhr such dissatisfied elements constitute a majority, not one of them can be drawn into the Revolutionary Trade-Union Opposition. To the question of the causes for this contradictory situation, the comrade replied that the members of the reformist trade unions do not want to join the Revolutionary Trade-Union Opposition as they do not want to pay double dues and also, a fear that joining the Red Trade-Union Opposition would bring about their expulsion from the reformist union. When the comrade was asked whether any attempt had been made to organise the opposition elements of the reformist trade union without demanding special membership dues, without filling out special questionnaires and membership cards of the Revolutionary Trade-Union Opposition, the comrade referred to the directions on the organisational structure of the revolutionary Trade Union Opposition which provide for membership cards, special dues, etc. These arguments of this Ruhr comrade are not an exception, yet this point of view represents a serious obstacle to the mass work of the Party. It is quite true that there are decisions of the higher organs to the effect that the Revolutionary Trade-Union Opposition in Germany must have membership cards, dues, etc., but not one document of the Comintern, R.I.L.U. and C.P. of Germany itself says that these decisions must be applied mechanically. Not a single decision of the Comintern, R.I.L.U. or C.P. of Germany says that if the members of the reformist trade unions which are opposed to their leadership do not want to pay special dues to the Red Trade-Union Opposition, do not yet want to give their signature to their affiliation to the Red Trade-Union Opposition and to the R.I.L.U., the conclusion must be drawn that such members of the reformist trade unions must not be won for the Red Trade-Union Opposition. Such views constitute "leftist" sectarianism of the worst sort. From all the directions of the Comintern and R.I.L.U., from all the latest decisions of the C.C. of the C.P. of Germany it clearly appears that in regard to members of the reformist trade unions who still hesitate to join the Red Trade-Union Opposition officially, it is necessary to continue the most determined and stubborn educational work, to give special attention to individual agitation and to continue at the same time their organisational affiliation, but not necessarily merely in the form of an obligatory demand to pay membership dues, keep a membership card, etc., but in the most varied flexible and loose forms, keeping in mind as the basic policy, the need for attracting these reformist workers into concrete movements of protest and into concrete struggles against the employers and the fascists. The basic rule, the "supreme law" of the organisational structure of the Communist Parties is that the Party must employ only such organisational forms as facilitate and help to attract the great masses into the revolutionary struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and facilitate the leadership of this struggle, and if the established organisational forms, structure and methods of Party work develop into an obstacle to the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses, these forms and methods must make room for others, more in accord with this basic and decisive demand for the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses.

From this point of view, in all cases when members of the reformist trade unions are in serious doubt as to the advisability of breaking with their traditions and organisations (and this apparently is a typical phenomenon at the beginning of our work within the reformist trade unions) it is necessary to begin to organise the discontented opposition elements with the most primitive forms. To begin with they should be organised at their own meetings and conferences. It is necessary to see to it, by all means, that at all meetings, conferences and congresses of the reformist trade unions our comrades should move definite proposals (which should be first carefully discussed in the respective Party committee with comrades from the fractions of the respective trade union organisations). It is not at all necessary that these comrades should be members of our Party, nor is it necessary for them to speak in the name of the Party and Red Trade-Union Opposition. They should be generally forbidden to deliver long speeches covering every subject on earth, and the struggle against all possible deviations: for the trade union meetings and conferences short, concrete, business-like proposals should be prepared which should be based upon the protection of the immediate interests of all the workers understood by the widest mass (against wage cuts, dismissals, etc.); at the same time it is necessary to point out how these proposals should be carried into effect, how they are related to the ultimate tasks of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the comrades present at the meeting should be advised not to leave until the end, for a decision will have to be made. Should we prove

to be in the minority in the voting, but in a relatively strong minority, it will be necessary to attempt to organise this minority into a meeting right on the spot (again without any demands for special signatures, membership dues, etc., but for the purpose of discussing concrete steps about how to carry out the rejected proposals, etc.).

It is easiest (and most important) to develop this work directly in the factories where our comrades have greater facilities to approach the reformist workers on the basis of the concrete every-day events of factory life, where they are able to more easily organise individual agitation among the reformist workers, to arrange special conferences (here again it is necessary to begin with concrete questions of the general common struggle), etc.

In all of these cases it is necessary to make the most extensive use of the initiative of the opposition members of the reformist trade unions themselves, who will naturally seek organisational forms themselves to give vent to their opposition sentiments. These forms will in many cases be very imperfect from the point of view of their completeness, consistency, etc., but should they promote the consolidation of the oppositionary and revolutionary workers in the reformist trade unions, as well as the workers of all political tendencies, our Party must support these tendencies and by patient and flexible work strengthen and develop this to a higher stage from within, with the aid of the fraction. This will be the practical realisation of the united front policy which has been, and remains a most important instrument for the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses under the leadership of our Party, though it is an instrument which one must command the use of, otherwise it may hit you hard over the head. The "Party Worker" must extensively deal with these concrete questions, and resolutely fight against all attempts at a mechanical approach to the question of the organisation of the Red Trade-Union Opposition. It is particularly necessary to show concrete examples of how to approach the reformist workers, how our factory groups must act in this direction.

There is still another important question which must be dealt with in the pages of the "Party Worker" and which it is still unpardonably ignoring; this is the question of preparation for an illegal existence. Of course, in a legal organ it is impossible to deal with conspirative subjects, *but it is possible and necessary to explain the rules of elementary conspiracy, to point out the different forms of combining illegal with semi-legal and legal work, etc.* It is necessary to combat in the most merciless manner the capitulationist tendencies which are already beginning to be manifested. Thus, the Communist fraction of the "Free Thinkers' " leadership, after the publication of the dissolution order, put up no resistance to this police regulation. This is a bad sign. The entire Party press, particularly the "Party Worker," must condemn such capitulationist sentiments, start a determined preventive struggle against them, helping the comrades in the mass organisations to rebuild their work if necessary, in the proper direction in order to prevent the breakdown of the organisation, the discontinuation of the mass work, to make the police prohibitions themselves a starting point for an even broader mass work, a starting point for the attraction to the struggle of even greater masses, including Social-Democratic workers and members of the reformist trade unions. All this will be possible should the Party create in due time a strong illegal body capable of withstanding all police repressions. On this question we have already suggested a number of points in the previous issues of "The Communist International," and we shall repeatedly return to them in the future. In conclusion we must say that we expect the July issue of the "Party Worker" to be strictly in accord with the spirit of the directions of the last Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P. of Germany and that the editors will take into consideration also the remarks made in this article.

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